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ABSTRACT 
This work presents research on practices in the day-ahead electric energy market, 
including replication practices and reliability coordinators used by some market operators 
to demonstrate the impact these practices have on market outcomes. The practice of con-
straint relaxations similar to those an Independent System Operator (ISO) might perform 
in day-ahead market models is implemented. The benefits of these practices are well un-
derstood by the industry; however, the implications these practices have on market out-
comes and system security have not been thoroughly investigated. By solving a day-
ahead market model with and without select constraint relaxations and comparing the re-
sulting market outcomes and possible effects on system security, the effect of these con-
straint relaxation practices is demonstrated. 
Proposed market solutions are often infeasible because constraint relaxation prac-
tices and approximations that are incorporated into market models. Therefore, the dis-
patch solution must be corrected to ensure its feasibility. The practice of correcting the 
proposed dispatch solution after the market is solved is known as out-of-market correc-
tions (OMCs), defined as any action an operator takes that modifies a proposed day-ahead 
dispatch solution to ensure operating and reliability requirements. The way in which 
OMCs affect market outcomes is illustrated through the use of different corrective proce-
dures. The objective of the work presented is to demonstrate the implications of these in-
dustry practices and assess the impact these practices have on market outcomes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Statement of Research Area 
The electric power industry is challenged by the task of ensuring a reliable and 
continuous supply of electric energy, which, unlike other consumable goods, must be 
generated, delivered, and consumed simultaneously. Market operators are required to 
manage their generation fleet constrained by complex operating requirements while 
maintaining synchronism and managing thousands of miles of transmission assets. Op-
erators must also follow strict federal and regional reliability standards, cope with de-
mand, and more recently, generation uncertainty, all while having limited economical 
energy storage capability. Due to the complexity of these requirements, the industry ap-
proximates these requirements, particularly when operators are solving their deterministic 
unit commitment models.  
In addition to approximation, the unit commitment models currently employed by 
operators also have their requirements relaxed in order to ensure that operators obtain a 
solution. The proposed solution, with the resulting relaxations and approximations, may 
be modified because it is likely to be infeasible for not satisfying some particular re-
quirement. The modifications that occur outside of the market (hence the term, “out-of-
market correction”), are due to relaxations and approximations that affect the outcomes 
of the markets, of concern to market participants who perceive these modifications as bi-
ased interventions by operators. However, these modifications are necessary because, 
again, the proposed solution was truly infeasible.  
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The industry seeks to understand the effect constraint relaxation and out-of-
market correction practices have on market outcomes, which the work presented in this 
report and yet to be conducted seeks to characterize. To gain a better understanding, a 
survey of constraint relaxation and out-of-market corrections as practiced by different 
system operators was conducted. Constraint relaxation practices deemed critical were 
replicated in a day-ahead market model. This market model was solved with and without 
the constraint relaxation practices and the resulting market outcomes were compared. 
Different corrective procedures for out-of-market correction practices were developed 
and tested against a standard reliability requirement criterion, known as N-1 reliability, 
where the removal of one critical element in the system does not cause violations. After 
N-1 reliability was achieved, the procedures were compared to the market before and af-
ter the modifications were made to demonstrate their effect on market outcomes. 
1.2 Literature Survey: Constraint Relaxations 
 Several ISOs and RTOs utilize constraint relaxations in their market model, in-
cluding CAISO, ERCOT, and SPP [1]-[6]. This practice is implemented by including 
slack variables in constraints that the ISO chooses to have relaxed. The ISO then discour-
ages the market model from readily choosing to relax constraints by forcing the model to 
pay a penalty price for the relaxations present in the solution. The penalty price is a pre-
determined parameter set by the ISO and is typically negotiated with market participants.  
By allowing certain constraints to be violated for a set penalty price, the market model 
still imposes the constraint, but not as a “hard” constraint, which could otherwise cause 
the market model to be infeasible and result in no solution returned. By incorporating 
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these as “soft” constraints, operators are ensured a solution is obtained from the day-
ahead security constrained unit commitment (SCUC) market model. Furthermore, the ap-
proximations incorporated in these market models could limit the model from finding a 
feasible solution. Therefore, it is argued that these constraints should be modeled as soft 
constraints, which may be violated for a set penalty price, instead of hard constraints that 
must always be satisfied. Another benefit enjoyed by operators from these constraint re-
laxation practices is price control. The penalty price acts as a bid cap to the constraint of 
the slack variable to which it was added. 
There has been some investigation into constraint relaxation practices. In [7] and 
[8], new pricing mechanisms for penalty factors are proposed similar to the one proposed 
by ERCOT. Both reports propose a “multi-step” penalty price function in place of the 
fixed-price penalty prices used today. For example, [7] in particular scrutinizes transmis-
sion constraint pricing, because it affects the Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs), a mar-
ket clearing mechanism used at a particular location in the network to determine the 
amount paid generators for their energy production or to charge customers for their con-
sumption. In [8], simulations were performed to assess the effects of different penalty 
pricing structures on Southwest Power Pool’s (SPP) Security Constrained Economic Dis-
patch (SCED) model. 
Penalty prices are agreed upon by the ISO along with their stakeholders and are 
approved by the utility commission. At CAISO, operators separate the day-ahead market, 
also known as the Integrated Forward Market (IFM), into a “Scheduling Run” and a 
“Pricing Run” [9]. The scheduling run has higher penalty prices and prioritizes the en-
forcement of some constraints over others. For example, CAISO’s scheduling run has a 
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$6500/MWh penalty price for violating the market energy balance constraint, which is 
prioritized higher than the ancillary service non-spin requirement because it only has a 
penalty price of $2250/MWh [1]. When solved, the scheduling run determines the dis-
patch solution for the forward, day-ahead, market. The scheduling run’s solution may 
have relaxed some constraints. It is fed into the pricing run, which has lower penalty 
prices, where CAISO determines settlements for the IFM. The pricing run solution is not 
allowed to deviate significantly from the scheduling run solution [10] because the pricing 
run determines the settlement policy for the generators that were awarded dispatches in 
the scheduling run. This separation changes the resulting prices, i.e. the LMPs. In particu-
lar, the scheduling run at CAISO had a $6500/MWh penalty price on energy balance con-
straints, whereas in the pricing run, the system only pays $500/MWh. As a result, for a 
node that had a constraint relaxation, i.e. the slack variable was greater than zero, the 
LMP is restricted to $500. Thus if a generator is located at that bus, that particular gen-
erator would not receive a higher profit. At CAISO, these constraint relaxation practices 
also extend to other areas in the market, such as in their Residual Unit Commitment 
(RUC), also known as a reliability unit commitment, and in the Real-Time Market 
(RTM).  
ERCOT follows similar procedures in their Day-Ahead Market (DAM) and lists 
their penalty prices, which they call penalty factors in [5]. ERCOT also proposes using a 
staircase penalty cost function in its DAM, represented in Figure 1.1. ERCOT currently 
still appears to use a single penalty price of $5,000,000/MWh for the under/over genera-
tion constraint [5]. 
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The Southwest Power Pool (SPP) also appears to follow the same practice in its 
day-ahead market, or in its terminology, the DA Market. SPP states that it allows for 
“Violation Relaxation Limits” to occur when a feasible solution cannot be obtained when 
trying to enforce all constraints. This is listed along with their penalty prices in [2]. For 
example, SPP has a “Global Power Balance” constraint whose penalty price is set to 
$50,000. 
 
Figure 1.1 Proposed Staircase Penalty Price Function by ERCOT [5]. 
Currently, what is understood from industry is that ISOs and RTOs apply con-
straint relaxations practices in a similar manner. Choosing select constraints to relax, the 
ISO or RTO will add slack variables to the constraints and associate a penalty price to 
these slack variables in the objective function. ISOs and RTOs begin to differ on which 
constraints to relax, the penalty price values, and the structure of these penalty prices. In 
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this chapter, only some of the constraint relaxation practices that ISOs and RTOs incor-
porate into their market models were considered for evaluation. Further investigation into 
other ISOs has been documented in Chapter 3. 
1.3 Literature Survey: Out-of-Market Corrections 
To solve the complex problem of dispatching energy efficiently at the day-ahead 
time stage, a SCUC model is solved with various approximations for all the relevant op-
erating constraints. Due to inaccuracies in the day-ahead market process, corrections will 
eventually need to be made. These corrections, known as Out-of-Market Corrections 
(OMCs), are any modifications made to the market solution when it does not satisfy op-
erational and reliability requirements. OMCs are employed by all system operators, re-
gardless whether the organization is an Independent System Operator (ISO) or a vertical-
ly integrated utility. For example, some market models ignore power transfer distribution 
factors (PTDFs) below a certain threshold [1]. These small PTDFs affect the flow of 
power on transmission assets; however, they remain unaccounted for, which can lead to 
an infeasible operating state, thereby requiring a correction to the market solution. Apply-
ing OMCs after the market solution has been posted is one method of performing these 
corrections. 
OMCs can be performed in a more formalized manner. The day-ahead scheduling 
process occurs in multiple stages. The system operator first solves a unit commitment 
formulation that includes all market participants and after approving the dispatch solu-
tion, the operator solves a reliability unit commitment (RUC) model [11]. The RUC itself 
could also be solved in multiple stages, such as using a scheduling and pricing run [9]. 
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Within the RUC, the operator seeks to acquire more capacity to ensure it can satisfy fore-
casted demand for the next operating day, which may not have been acquired by market 
participants and is known as Load Serving Entities (LSEs) because these organizations 
may have decided to acquire the rest of the capacity in the real-time market [11]. Never-
theless, the RUC still may not have achieved a reliable day-ahead dispatch solution and 
therefore, informal OMC procedures will be used. The industry has several differing 
terms for OMCs, including uneconomic adjustments [1], manual dispatch [12], security 
corrections [13], exceptional dispatches [14], and out-of-merit energy/capacity [15]. 
The current approach taken by market operators today is to solve a deterministic 
unit commitment formulation. MISO’s approach [16] is similar, where a SCUC is first 
solved and the dispatch is reviewed by their operators with their deliverability test until 
the day-ahead dispatch solution is approved. Approximations in the market model require 
MISO operators to review the day-ahead dispatch solution; any action taken by the opera-
tor that modifies the day-ahead dispatch solution is an OMC. This process is displayed in 
Figure 1.2 below. 
System operators could solve a stochastic unit commitment formulation [17], but 
these formulations still include approximations, such as modeling the network with di-
rect-current optimal power flow (DCOPF) instead of a more realistic alternating-current 
optimal power flow (ACOPF). In [18], the complexity required in the unit commitment 
model is discussed. 
Due to all the approximations and limitations within the day-ahead market, OMCs 
are needed to obtain a dispatch solution that is feasible and operates within reliability 
standards, but implementing OMCs increases the total system costs. In CAISO’s system, 
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OMCs accounted for $43 million in 2011, reduced to $34 million in 2012 [19]. In 2006, 
ERCOT reported that it acquired approximately $80 million worth of OMCs to ensure the 
reliability of their system [20]. CAISO, ERCOT, and SPP briefly state their procedures 
with OMCs in their respective day-ahead market procedures [1]-[4], [9]. 
 
Figure 1.2 MISO Day-Ahead Market Process [16]. 
1.4 Thesis Organization 
 A total of seven chapters are included in this thesis. Chapter 1 introduces the 
scope of the research area and includes a survey of the literature and an outline of the the-
sis organization. Chapter 2 presents a background of a deterministic SCUC day-ahead 
formulation, including the approximation made for optimal power flow (OPF) within typ-
ical SCUC formulations. Chapter 3 contains an industry review of constraint relaxation 
practices for various energy markets. In Chapter 4, a modified version of the day-ahead 
unit commitment formulation is presented with applicable constraint relaxations. Chapter 
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5 investigates the effects of two different penalty price schemes for reserve relaxations on 
N-1 security and market outcomes. Chapter 6 describes a contingency analysis tool de-
veloped to check for N-1 reliability along with specialized algorithms and heuristics that 
were utilized to guarantee N-1 reliability. The final chapter is devoted to concluding re-
marks. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 Introduction 
 To replicate the approach that an ISO or RTO might take for allocating resources 
in the day-ahead setting, the fundamental practices must be stated, especially the approx-
imations these organizations make when solving a deterministic SCUC. To account for 
the transmission network, a derivation of the linearized DCOPF is described in Chapter 
2.2 and subsequently in Chapter 2.3 followed by one formulation for a day-ahead SCUC. 
In Chapter 2.4 an example of the impact constraint relaxation practices have on a linear 
program’s dual variables is presented. Chapter 2.5 describes a DC-based contingency 
analysis model that tests the SCUC dispatch solution for N-1 reliability while Chapter 2.6 
presents an extensive-form SCUC that minimizes base-case (no contingency state) that 
accounts for post-contingency states. Finally, a summary is given in Chapter 2.7. 
2.2 Optimal Power Flow Formulation 
 The process to optimally schedule the delivery of power is a challenging problem 
for system operators today. In day-ahead markets operated by ISOs, operators seek the 
least costly dispatch solution that delivers power while guaranteeing reliability. Due to 
the complexity of the problem, some assumptions must be made. One main assumption is 
how the transmission network is modeled. In the unit commitment models developed in 
this thesis, a DCOPF formulation is utilized and derived based on [21]. 
A true representation of the network would include an Alternating Current Opti-
mal Power Flow (ACOPF). Starting with the π-equivalent circuit of a transmission line 
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shown in Figure 2.1, the real and reactive power flow equations over an individual line 
can be derived. Note that the index 𝑘 represents the particular transmission line, while 𝑚 
and 𝑛 represent the ‘from’ and ‘to’ buses connected by the transmission line. 
𝑉𝑚  𝑉𝑛  
𝐼𝑛  
 
Figure 2.1. The Π-Equivalent Circuit of a Transmission Line. 
𝑧𝑘 = 𝑟𝑘 + 𝑗𝑥𝑘 (2.1) 
𝑦𝑘 =
1
𝑧𝑘
=
1
𝑟𝑘+𝑗𝑥𝑘
×
𝑟𝑘−𝑗𝑥𝑘
𝑟𝑘−𝑗𝑥𝑘
=
𝑟𝑘−𝑗𝑥𝑘
𝑟𝑘
2+𝑥𝑘
2 =
𝑟𝑘
𝑟𝑘
2+𝑥𝑘
2 −
𝑗𝑥𝑘
𝑟𝑘
2+𝑥𝑘
2 = 𝑔𝑘 + 𝑗𝑏𝑘 (2.2) 
𝑉𝑚 = |𝑉𝑚|∠𝜃𝑚 = |𝑉𝑚|(𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃𝑚 + 𝑗𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃𝑚) (2.3) 
𝑉𝑛 = |𝑉𝑛|∠𝜃𝑛 = |𝑉𝑛|(𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃𝑛 + 𝑗𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃𝑛) (2.4) 
𝐼𝑚 = 𝑉𝑚 (
𝑗𝑏𝑠ℎ
2
) +
?̃?𝑚−?̃?𝑛
𝑧𝑘
= ?̃?𝑛 (
𝑗𝑏𝑠ℎ
2
) + 𝑦𝑘(?̃?𝑚 − ?̃?𝑛) (2.5) 
𝐼𝑚 = 𝑉𝑀 (
𝑗𝑏𝑠ℎ
2
) + (𝑔𝑘 + 𝑗𝑏𝑘)(?̃?𝑚 − ?̃?𝑛) = 𝑉𝑚 (𝑔𝑘 + 𝑗𝑏𝑘 +
𝑗𝑏𝑠ℎ
2
) − 𝑉𝑛(𝑔𝑘 + 𝑗𝑏𝑘) (2.6) 
𝑆𝑘
𝑚𝑛 = 𝑉𝑚𝐼𝑚
∗ = 𝑉𝑚 (𝑉𝑚 (𝑔𝑘 + 𝑗𝑏𝑘 +
𝑗𝑏𝑠ℎ
2
) − 𝑉𝑛(𝑔𝑘 + 𝑗𝑏𝑘))
∗
 (2.7) 
𝑆𝑘
𝑚𝑛 = |𝑉𝑚|
2 (𝑔𝑘 − 𝑗𝑏𝑘 −
𝑗𝑏𝑠ℎ
2
) − 𝑉𝑚𝑉𝑛(𝑔𝑘 − 𝑗𝑏𝑘) (2.8) 
𝑆𝑘
𝑚𝑛 = |𝑉𝑚|
2 (𝑔𝑘 − 𝑗𝑏𝑘 −
𝑗𝑏𝑠ℎ
2
) − (|𝑉𝑚||𝑉𝑛|∠𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑛)(𝑗𝑘 − 𝑗𝑏𝑘) (2.9) 
𝑆𝑘
𝑚𝑛 = |𝑉𝑚|
2 (𝑔𝑘 − 𝑗𝑏𝑘 −
𝑗𝑏𝑠ℎ
2
) − |𝑉𝑚||𝑉𝑛|(cos(𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑛) + 𝑗 sin(𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑛))(𝑔𝑘 − 𝑗𝑏𝑘) 
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 (2.10) 
𝑆𝑘
𝑚𝑛 = |𝑉𝑚|
2 (𝑔𝑘 − 𝑗𝑏𝑘 −
𝑗𝑏𝑠ℎ
2
) − |𝑉𝑚||𝑉𝑛|(𝑔𝑘 cos(𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑛) − 𝑗𝑏𝑘 cos(𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑛)  
 +𝑗𝑔𝑘 sin(𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑛) + 𝑏𝑘 sin(𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑛)) (2.11) 
𝑆𝑘
𝑚𝑛 = |𝑉𝑚|
2 (𝑔𝑘 − 𝑗𝑏𝑘 −
𝑗𝑏𝑠ℎ
2
) − |𝑉𝑚||𝑉𝑛|(𝑔𝑘 cos(𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑛) + 𝑗𝑏𝑘 sin(𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑛))  
 −𝑗|𝑉𝑚||𝑉𝑛|(𝑔𝑘 sin(𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑛) − 𝑏𝑘 cos(𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑛)) (2.12) 
From (2.12), the complex power sent from bus 𝑚 to bus 𝑛 was derived. The asso-
ciated real and reactive power flows can now be separated as follows: 
𝑆𝑘
𝑚𝑛 = 𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑛 + 𝑗𝑄𝑘
𝑚𝑛 (2.13) 
𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑛 = |𝑉𝑚|
2𝑔𝑘 − |𝑉𝑚||𝑉𝑛|(𝑔𝑘 cos(𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑛) + 𝑏𝑘 sin(𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑛)) (2.14) 
𝑄𝑘
𝑚𝑛 = −|𝑉𝑚|
2 (𝑏𝑘 +
𝑏𝑠ℎ
2
) − |𝑉𝑚||𝑉𝑛|(𝑔𝑘 sin(𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑛) − 𝑗𝑏𝑘 cos(𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑛)) (2.15) 
Now that equations have been derived for real and reactive power flow, an ACOPF dis-
patch problem can be completed. The control variables associated with the power flow 
equations in the ACOPF are the voltages (𝑉𝑚 and 𝑉𝑛) and the bus angles (𝜃𝑚 and 𝜃𝑛). It is 
typically assumed that voltage levels must remain within five percent of their rated values 
and this is reflected in (2.20). Another criterion is that the angle difference between two 
buses cannot exceed the stability limit, approximately 0.52 radians. Equations (2.16) to 
(2.22) represent the ACOPF. 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∑ 𝑐𝑔𝑃𝑔𝑔  (2.16) 
∑ 𝑃𝑘𝑘𝜖𝛿+(𝑛) − ∑ 𝑃𝑘𝑘𝜖𝛿−(𝑛) + ∑ 𝑃𝑔𝑔𝜖𝑔(𝑛) = 𝑑𝑛 ∀𝑛 (2.17) 
∑ 𝑄𝑘𝑘𝜖𝛿+(𝑛) − ∑ 𝑄𝑘𝑘𝜖𝛿−(𝑛) + ∑ 𝑄𝑔𝑔𝜖𝑔(𝑛) = 𝑞𝑛 ∀𝑛 (2.18) 
𝑃𝑘
2 + 𝑄𝑘
2 ≤ (𝑆𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥)2 ∀𝑘 (2.19) 
0.95 ≤ 𝑉𝑛 ≤ 1.05 ∀𝑛 (2.20) 
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−0.52 ≤ 𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑛 ≤ 0.52 ∀𝑛 (2.21) 
0 ≤ 𝑃𝑔 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∀𝑔 (2.22) 
Due to the added complexity of the unit commitment models, operators linearize 
the power flow equations to derive what is called a DCOPF. The assumptions for the 
DCOPF are as follows: (1) reactive power is ignored; (2) conductance (𝑔𝑘) in the trans-
mission lines is much smaller than the susceptance (𝑏𝑘) and, therefore, it is assumed that 
the conductance is negligible (𝑔𝑘 = 0); (3) the angle difference between bus (𝑖) and (𝑗) is 
relatively small and, therefore, approximations are made to simplify the trigonometric 
terms: cos(𝜃𝑖 − 𝜃𝑗) ≈ 1 and sin(𝜃𝑖 − 𝜃𝑗) ≈ (𝜃𝑖 − 𝜃𝑗); (4) the voltages of 𝑉𝑖 and 𝑉𝑗 are 
assumed to be 1 per unit. With a linear objective function, the DCOPF is a linear program 
(LP). The DCOPF formulation becomes, 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∑ 𝑐𝑔𝑃𝑔𝑔  (2.23) 
∑ 𝑃𝑘𝑘𝜖𝛿+(𝑛) − ∑ 𝑃𝑘𝑘𝜖𝛿−(𝑛) + ∑ 𝑃𝑔𝑔𝜖𝑔(𝑛) = 𝑑𝑛 ∀𝑛 (2.24) 
−𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≤ 𝑃𝑘 ≤ 𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∀𝑘 (2.25) 
𝑃𝑘 − 𝑏𝑘(𝜃𝑛 − 𝜃𝑚) = 0 ∀𝑘 (2.26) 
0 ≤ 𝑃𝑔 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∀𝑔  (2.27) 
2.3 Security Constrained Unit Commitment Model 
The SCUC model, used for this study, is a deterministic mixed integer program, 
which resembles the deterministic SCUC that is used in day-ahead market models. Its 
solution is used to produce the day-ahead market solution. The model presented is a 
mixed integer linear program, with the objective of: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∑ ∑ (𝑐𝑔
𝑜𝑝𝑃𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑁𝐿𝑢𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝑈𝑣𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝐷𝑤𝑔𝑡)𝑡𝑔   (2.28) 
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The total system cost (2.28) is represented by linear cost term in 𝑐𝑔
𝑜𝑝𝑃𝑔𝑡, where 
𝑐𝑔
𝑜𝑝
 is the linear fixed cost and 𝑃𝑔𝑡 is the supply for each generator during each time peri-
od. The fixed costs are represented by binary variables (whose value could only be 0 or 
1) in 𝑢𝑔𝑡, 𝑣𝑔𝑡, and 𝑤𝑔𝑡, which represent the generator status, startup indicator, and shut-
down indicator. Therefore, the term 𝑐𝑔
𝑁𝐿𝑢𝑔𝑡 represents the fixed no-load cost term and 
𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝑈𝑣𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝐷𝑤𝑔𝑡 represent the startup and shutdown costs, respectively.  
The binary variables 𝑣𝑔𝑡 and 𝑤𝑔𝑡 are related to the status binary, 𝑢𝑔𝑡, which rep-
resents the periods that a unit is committed. A generator turned on during a specific time 
period is represented by the binary 𝑣𝑔𝑡, the startup variable, whereas a de-committed 
generator is represented by 𝑤𝑔𝑡, the shutdown variable. These variables are restricted to a 
binary output because the formulation presented here does not guarantee a binary output.  
𝑣𝑔𝑡 ≥ 𝑢𝑔𝑡 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡−1  ∀𝑔, 𝑡  (2.29) 
𝑤𝑔𝑡 ≥ 𝑢𝑔𝑡−1 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡  ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (2.30) 
The SCUC replicates generator operating constraints. For example, the minimum 
and maximum production levels are represented by the parameters 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥 re-
spectively. In (2.31) and (2.32), a committed generator must be between its minimum 
production level and its maximum production level. The variable 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑆𝑃 represents the spin-
ning reserve acquired for a given generator during a specific time period and therefore the 
production level plus the spinning reserve must be less than the maximum supply level 
since in the event of a contingency, a generator cannot provide power greater than its 
maximum production level. Thus, the reserve acquired plus the production level must be 
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less than the maximum production level. These operational constraints are represented 
below. 
𝑃𝑔𝑡 ≥ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑔𝑡  ∀𝑔, 𝑡  (2.31) 
𝑃𝑔𝑡 + 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑆𝑃 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑢𝑔𝑡 ∀𝑔, 𝑡  (2.32) 
Operational generator requirements extend beyond minimum and maximum pro-
duction levels. Another set of requirements include minimum time up and down that a 
committed/de-committed generator has after a unit has been turned on or off. This is rep-
resented in (2.33) and (2.34), where the summation of the startup and shutdown binary 
variable is over the minimum up and down time requirement, respectively. 
∑ 𝑣𝑔𝑠
𝑡
𝑠=𝑡−𝑈𝑇𝑔−1 ≤ 𝑢𝑔𝑡 ∀𝑔  (2.33) 
∑ 𝑤𝑔𝑠
𝑡
𝑠=𝑡−𝐷𝑇𝑔−1 ≤ 1 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡 ∀𝑔 (2.34) 
Another generator operational constraint included in the SCUC is the hourly ramp 
rate. For simplicity, startup and shutdown ramp rates are assumed to be the maximum 
production level of the generator, 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥. The ramp up and down constraints, using only 
hourly ramp rates, are shown in (2.35) and (2.36). 
𝑢𝑔𝑡−1𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅 + 𝑣𝑔𝑡𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≥ 𝑃𝑔𝑡 − 𝑃𝑔𝑡−1 ∀𝑔, 𝑡  (2.35) 
𝑢𝑔𝑡𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅 + 𝑤𝑔𝑡𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≥ 𝑃𝑔𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑔𝑡 ∀𝑔, 𝑡  (2.36) 
Apart from generator operational constraints, the unit commitment model seeks to 
ensure N-1 reliable dispatch by also acquiring reserve. Committed generators could have 
their production level reduced to provide spinning reserve in the case of a contingency. 
Reserve could also be provided in the form of non-spinning reserve from fast-start gener-
ators. The total reserve acquired from the system during a given time period must be at 
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least 7% of the total demand during that specific hour and greater than the largest genera-
tor production level plus any spinning reserve acquired from that generator, represented 
in (2.37) and (2.38). The total reserve acquired is also constrained to be at least half from 
spinning reserve, shown in (2.39). Furthermore, the total reserve for the given time period 
is also constrained to 7% of the total load, which follows [22]. 
𝑟𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ≥ ∑ 0.07𝑛 𝑑𝑛𝑡  ∀𝑛, 𝑡 (2.37) 
𝑟𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ≥ 𝑃𝑔𝑡 + 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑆𝑃  ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (2.38) 
∑ 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑆𝑃
𝑔 ≥ 0.5 𝑟𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  ∀𝑡 (2.39) 
The amount of spinning reserve acquired for a committed unit is further con-
strained by the emergency ramp rate of the specific generator. This restriction is needed 
because, in case of a contingency, a generator can only move within the emergency ramp 
rate. Any spinning reserve acquired in the unit commitment model must also be con-
strained to the emergency ramp rate. 
𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑆𝑃 ≤ 𝑅𝑔
𝐸𝑀𝑢𝑔𝑡  ∀𝑔, 𝑡  (2.40) 
Non-spinning reserve can only be acquired by fast-start generators. A binary pa-
rameter 𝐹𝑆𝑔 is set to 1 to indicate a fast-start generator and 0 otherwise. Paired with this 
binary parameter, the non-spinning reserve acquired is constrained between a generator’s 
minimum and maximum production levels for units that are not committed. 
0 ≤ 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑁𝑆 ≤ 𝑅𝑔
𝐸𝑀(1 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡)𝐹𝑆𝑔 ∀𝑔, 𝑡  (2.41) 
𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑁𝑆 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥(1 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡)𝐹𝑆𝑔  ∀𝑔, 𝑡  (2.42) 
Based on a DCOPF, the transmission network included in the unit commitment 
model are constrained by (2.43) to (2.44), where (2.45) is a node balance constraint. Al-
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ternatively, the line flow constraints could be formulated with the power transfer distribu-
tion factors (PTDFs) of the transmission network. 
𝑃𝑘𝑡 − 𝐵𝑘(𝜃𝑛𝑡 − 𝜃𝑚𝑡) = 0 ∀𝑘, 𝑡  (2.43) 
−𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≤ 𝑃𝑘𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∀𝑘, 𝑡  (2.44) 
∑ 𝑃𝑘𝑡𝑘𝜖𝛿+(𝑛) − ∑ 𝑃𝑘𝑡𝑘𝜖𝛿−(𝑛) + ∑ 𝑃𝑔𝑡𝑔𝜖𝑔(𝑛) = 𝑑𝑛𝑡 ∀𝑛, 𝑡 (2.45) 
𝑢𝑔𝑡, 𝑣𝑔𝑡 , 𝑤𝑔𝑡 ∈ {0,1} ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (2.46) 
There are several forms and modifications that can be made to better represent the 
system. For example, in another formulation presented in Chapter 4.2, the generator op-
eration constraints governing the minimum up and down time requirements are updated 
such that in the day-ahead unit commitment model, the beginning and ending periods de-
pend on each other. There are several different reserve requirement rules that could be 
used in an attempt to guarantee N-1 reliability, but these reserve requirements do not nec-
essarily guarantee reliability. 
2.4 Example of the Impact Constraint Relaxations have on the Dual Variable 
In an LP or mixed integer linear program (MILP), a constraint relaxation is incor-
porated into the problem by adding a slack variable to the particular constraint and to the 
objective with a penalty price. Formulating the LP or MILP in this manner limits the dual 
variable associated with the relaxed constraint. As long as the slack variable is not lim-
ited, the penalty price is the maximum value of the dual variable.  
Constraint relaxation is a mechanism to manage prices. When applied to a market 
model, presented in Chapter 4.2, the dual variable in the associated constraints will also 
be limited by the penalty price. Early deregulated electric energy markets only limited the 
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bid price of market participants (generators). However, this policy does not limit the loca-
tional market price (LMP), the price used for settling the market at that node. The LMP 
can be limited allowing relaxations on the node/power balance constraint in the market 
model. If a particular node is relaxed, the LMP is limited to the penalty price; additional-
ly, the LMP will not exceed the set penalty price. Below is an example in Figure 2.2 and 
Figure 2.3. 
Standard Primal Problem Corresponding Dual Formulation 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒: 𝑐1𝑥1 + 𝑐2𝑥2 
𝑎11𝑥1 + 𝑎12𝑥2 ≥ 𝑏1 (𝜆1) 
𝑎21𝑥1 + 𝑎22𝑥2 ≥ 𝑏2 (𝜆2) 
𝑥1 ≥ 0 
𝑥2 ≥ 0 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒: 𝑏1𝜆1 + 𝑏2𝜆2 
𝑎11𝜆1 + 𝑎21𝜆2 ≤ 𝑐1 (𝑥1) 
𝑎12𝜆1 + 𝑎22𝜆2 ≤ 𝑐2 (𝑥2) 
𝜆1 ≥ 0 
𝜆2 ≥ 0 
Primal Problem with Constraint Relaxation 
Corresponding Dual Formulation of Primal 
with Constraint Relaxations 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒: 𝑐1𝑥1 + 𝑐2𝑥2 + 𝑃1𝑠1 + 𝑃2𝑠2 
𝑎11𝑥1 + 𝑎12𝑥2 ≥ 𝑏1 − 𝑠1 (𝜆1) 
𝑎21𝑥1 + 𝑎22𝑥2 ≥ 𝑏2 − 𝑠2 (𝜆2) 
𝑥1 ≥ 0 
𝑥2 ≥ 0 
𝑠1 ≥ 0 
𝑠2 ≥ 0 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒: 𝑏1𝜆1 + 𝑏2𝜆2 
𝑎11𝜆1 + 𝑎21𝜆2 ≤ 𝑐1 (𝑥1) 
𝑎12𝜆1 + 𝑎22𝜆2 ≤ 𝑐2 (𝑥2) 
𝜆1 ≤ 𝑃1 (𝑠1) 
𝜆2 ≤ 𝑃2 (𝑠2) 
𝜆1 ≥ 0 
𝜆2 ≥ 0 
Figure 2.2. LP Example to Demonstrate the Effects of Constraint Relaxations on Dual. 
The “Standard Primal Problem” exhibits hard constraints that cannot be violated, 
i.e., any solution found for the primal variables 𝑥1 and 𝑥2, must stay within the set 
bounds. Notice that in the corresponding Dual Formulation, the dual variables 𝜆1 and 𝜆2, 
are only restricted to be greater than zero. In the “Primal Problem with Constraint Re-
laxations,” constraints are relaxed by adding the slack variables 𝑠1 and 𝑠2. However, re-
laxing the constraint means that a penalty price must be paid, 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 in this example. 
In the corresponding dual formulation, the dual variables, 𝜆1 and 𝜆2, are now restricted 
and cannot exceed the corresponding penalty price, 𝑃1 and 𝑃2. 
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x2
x1
Feasible Region
s1
s2
a11x1 + a12x2   b1 – s1 
a21x1 + a22x2   b2 – s2 
 
Figure 2.3. Graphical Interpretation of Relaxing a Constraint. 
As demonstrated, relaxing a constraint while imposing a penalty price restricts the 
corresponding dual variables. When this occurs on the node balance constraint in the 
market model and the LMP, the basis of system settlements is restricted to the penalty 
price. Therefore, when CAISO performs its pricing run with a constraint relaxation on the 
node balance constraint with a penalty price of $500/MWh, a price cap is imposed on the 
LMP by relaxing the SCUC formulation. 
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2.5 Contingency Analysis 
Even with the reserve requirements built into the SCUC, unless all N-1 contin-
gencies are explicitly accounted for in the SCUC, the resulting dispatch solution is not 
guaranteed to be N-1 reliable. The tool presented here performs a steady-state N-1 relia-
bility test for each hour separately using a DCOPF formulation. The power flow on the 
transmission lines are allowed to exceed their designated short-term emergency limit, 
otherwise known as allowing for infinite transmission capacity. When this occurs, an N-1 
violation is reported because exceeding the short-term emergency limit means that the 
system is unable to deliver power reliably within the 15-minute interval (Figure 2.4). 
Within this interval, the system itself must respond to the contingency because this time 
interval allows for little operator action. Due to model tests for steady-state response with 
a DCOPF formulation, dynamic and AC feasibility testing must still be performed on the 
SCUC dispatch solution. However, it should be noted that a similar contingency analysis 
tool is offered by the industry vendor Alstom today [23]. 
To check whether the dispatch solution is N-1 feasible, contingency analysis is 
performed with the objective of minimizing line violations. In the model given below in 
Equations (2.47) to (2.58), the contingency analysis model allows for infinite transmis-
sion capability, which solves for each scenario 𝑐 separately. The system is said to be N-1 
infeasible when the line flow is above the emergency rated limits; that is 𝑠𝑘𝑡
+  and 𝑠𝑘𝑡
−  have 
a value other than zero. Here only the model with generator contingencies is given. A 
contingency analysis model with transmission asset contingencies can be seen in Appen-
dix B. 
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Figure 2.4. Transmission Line Ratings Where Rate C is the Short Term Emergency Rat-
ing, Rate B is the Long Term, and Rate A is the Rating During Normal Operating States, 
i.e., No Contingency Present. 
When a contingency occurs, committed generators are allowed to provide spin-
ning reserve acquired in the SCUC model. During contingency analysis, committed units 
move from their current output to new dispatch levels that are plus or minus their emer-
gency ramp rate. These are represented by the constraints shown in (2.48) and (2.49). 
Generators are still restricted to minimum and maximum limits and thus are enforced in 
the CA model by (2.48) and (2.49). Parameter 𝑁1𝑔 represents the contingency generator 
unit. In this case, the parameter is set to a value of zero. All generators are represented 
with a value of one because only one generator is removed during a simulation, whose 
value is set to zero. Other parameters include 𝑢𝑔𝑡  and 𝑃𝑔𝑡, which represent the generator 
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status and supply that was determined from the SCUC. The post-contingency supply lev-
el is represented by the variable, ?̂?𝑔𝑡. 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∑ ∑ 𝑠𝑘𝑡
+ + 𝑠𝑘𝑡
−
𝑡𝑘  ∀𝑐 (2.47) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≤ 𝑁1𝑔?̅?𝑔𝑡(?̅?𝑔𝑡 + 𝑅𝑔
𝐸𝑀) ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (2.48) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≥ 𝑁1𝑔?̅?𝑔𝑡(?̅?𝑔𝑡 − 𝑅𝑔
𝐸𝑀) ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (2.49) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≤ 𝑁1𝑔𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥?̅?𝑔𝑡 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (2.50) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≥ 𝑁1𝑔𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑖𝑛?̅?𝑔𝑡 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (2.51) 
Fast start generators participated in mitigating post contingency line violations by 
providing non-spinning reserve. In the contingency analysis, model fast-start generators 
are allowed to provide additional capacity up to their maximum supply rating. The mini-
mum supply rating is relaxed for fast-start generators, which do have a minimum capaci-
ty, by allowing only fast-start generators to be dispatched anywhere from zero to their 
maximum capacity. This relaxation is made such that the contingency analysis tool does 
not become a MIP. 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≤ 𝑁1𝑔𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∀𝑔, 𝑡, 𝐹𝑆𝑔 = 1 (2.52) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≥ 0 ∀𝑔, 𝑡, 𝐹𝑆𝑔 = 1 (2.53) 
The line flow constraints still hold in the contingency analysis model, but the 
transmission limit capacity constraints are modified by setting the transmission assets to 
the minimum and maximum flow of their emergency limits. Furthermore, the constraint 
is modified to allow for these transmission constraints to be violated through the use of 
the slack variables, 𝑠𝑘𝑡
+  and 𝑠𝑘𝑡
− . While the contingency analysis tool attempts to minimize 
these slack variables, if either of these is greater than zero for a given contingency, then a 
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violation is recorded because the system has been determined to be unreliable for that 
particular contingency. Therefore, the market solution is said to be N-1 infeasible. 
−𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ,𝑐 − 𝑠𝑘𝑡
− ≤ 𝑃𝑘𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑐 + 𝑠𝑘𝑡
+   ∀𝑘, 𝑡 (2.54) 
𝑃𝑘𝑡 − 𝐵𝑘(𝜃𝑛𝑡 − 𝜃𝑚𝑡) = 0 ∀𝑘, 𝑡 (2.55) 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
+ ≥ 0 ∀𝑘, 𝑡 (2.56) 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
− ≥ 0 ∀𝑘, 𝑡 (2.57) 
Finally, as before, the node balance constraint is also required for this model, 
which represents power flow in and out of the transmission lines connected to the node 
that must equal the supply of any generator at that node, less any demand. 
∑ 𝑃𝑘𝑡𝑘𝜖𝛿+(𝑛) − ∑ 𝑃𝑘𝑡𝑘𝜖𝛿−(𝑛) + ∑ 𝑃𝑔𝑡𝑔𝜖𝑔(𝑛) = 𝑑𝑛𝑡 ∀𝑛, 𝑡 (2.58) 
2.6 Extensive-Form Stochastic Unit Commitment 
Another market model used is the extensive-form stochastic unit commitment 
model (ESCUC), which guarantees an N-1 feasible dispatch solution. Originally this 
model was developed by [24], and included the capability of transmission switching. 
From [24], the objective function was modified to include the fixed generator cost, also 
known as no-load cost. Furthermore, the supply variable was updated to include all sce-
narios, so that now the supply variable is 𝑃𝑔𝑐𝑡 where c is the current scenario and when 𝑐 
is zero, i.e., no contingencies. However, the objective function shown in (2.59) only in-
corporates the scenario with no contingencies present because the model will account for 
all generator and non-radial transmission contingencies. The model will only seek to min-
imize the cost for the scenario with no contingencies. 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∑ ∑ (𝑐𝑔
𝑜𝑝𝑃𝑔0𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑁𝐿𝑢𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝑈𝑣𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝐷𝑤𝑔𝑡)𝑡𝑔  (2.59) 
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As with the previous SCUC model, the ESCUC includes binary variables that in-
dicate the generator status (𝑢𝑔𝑡), generator startup (𝑣𝑔𝑡), and generator shutdown (𝑤𝑔𝑡). 
The minimum up- and down-time related to each generator also utilizes this variable. 
𝑣𝑔𝑡 ≥ 𝑢𝑔𝑡 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡−1  ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (2.60) 
𝑤𝑔𝑡 ≥ 𝑢𝑔𝑡−1 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (2.61) 
∑ 𝑣𝑔𝑠
𝑡
𝑠=𝑡−𝑈𝑇𝑔+1 ≤ 𝑢𝑔𝑡 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (2.62) 
∑ 𝑤𝑔𝑠
𝑡
𝑠=𝑡−𝐷𝑇𝑔+1 ≤ 1 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (2.63) 
Unlike the original SCUC model used earlier, a PTDF formulation is used. PTDFs 
indicate the amount of power that flows from one particular bus to a reference bus 
through each transmission line, most of which are very close to zero. PTDFs change de-
pending on the scenario. For transmission line/assets contingencies, the topology of the 
network changes, but these PTDFs can be calculated offline to be included in the model. 
The PTDF formulation modifies the node balance constraint as well as the line limit con-
straints. Additionally, instead of using the variable 𝑃𝑘𝑡 for the line flow variable, a varia-
ble for the net-injection at a bus is used. 
𝑃𝑛𝑐𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗 + ∑ 𝑃𝑔𝑐𝑡𝑔𝜖𝑔(𝑛) = 𝑑𝑛𝑡 ∀𝑛, 𝑐, 𝑡 (2.64) 
−𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≤ ∑ 𝑃𝑛0𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑛 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛𝑘0
𝑅𝐸𝐹 ≤ 𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∀𝑘, 𝑐 = 0, 𝑡 (2.65) 
−𝑃𝑘
max(𝐸𝑀)𝑁1𝑒𝑐 ≤ ∑ 𝑃𝑛𝑐𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑛 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛𝑘𝑐
𝑅𝐸𝐹 ≤ 𝑃𝑘
max(𝐸𝑀)𝑁1𝑒𝑐 ∀𝑘, 𝑐 ≠ 0, 𝑡 (2.66) 
An advantage of the extensive-form stochastic unit commitment model is that the 
formulation is reflective of all pre- and post-contingency scenarios. Therefore, the dual of 
Equation (2.64), which is typically called the locational marginal price (LMP), reflects 
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the cost of delivering the next MWh in both the normal operating state and the post-
contingency states that are modeled to guarantee N-1 reliability. 
As part of the formulation, the parameter 𝑁1𝑒𝑐 indicates the current element 𝑒 
that is removed due to contingency scenario 𝑐, which includes generators and non-radial 
transmission assets. Only one element generator or transmission line is removed for each 
contingency scenario. Thus the element removed for the current scenario is assigned a 
value of zero to indicate the element has been removed, while all other elements are as-
signed a value of one.  
Generator bounds are applied to each generator with the addition of these bounds 
being applied to each scenario. These constrain the generator supply between its mini-
mum and maximum rating, which could be viewed in (2.67) and (2.68). 
𝑃𝑔𝑐𝑡 ≥ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑔𝑡𝑁1𝑒𝑐 ∀𝑔, 𝑐, 𝑡 (2.67) 
𝑃𝑔𝑐𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑢𝑔𝑡𝑁1𝑒𝑐 ∀𝑔, 𝑐, 𝑡 (2.68) 
The ramp rate constraints are similar to that of the SCUC, where only an hourly 
ramp rate is incorporated into the model. These constraints only apply to scenario zero 
when no contingencies are present, whose supply is represented by 𝑃𝑔0𝑡. For all other 
scenarios represented by 𝑃𝑔𝑐𝑡 where 𝑐 is greater than zero, the supply for that scenario is 
constrained to that obtained for the base case scenario, 𝑃𝑔0𝑡, plus or minus the emergency 
ramp rate. In other words, the model restricts the base case supply to account for all con-
tingencies by allowing the N-1 supply to move only within its emergency limits. 
𝑃𝑔0𝑡 − 𝑃𝑔0𝑡−1 ≤ 𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅𝑢𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥(1 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡−1) ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (2.69) 
𝑃𝑔0𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑔0𝑡 ≤ 𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅𝑢𝑔𝑡 + 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥(1 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡) ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (2.70) 
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𝑃𝑔𝑐𝑡 − 𝑃𝑔0𝑡 ≤ 𝑅𝑔
𝐸𝑀𝑢𝑔𝑡  ∀𝑔, (𝑔 ≠ 𝑐), 𝑡 (2.71) 
𝑃𝑔0𝑡 − 𝑃𝑔𝑐𝑡 ≤ 𝑅𝑔
𝐸𝑀𝑢𝑔𝑡 ∀𝑔, (𝑔 ≠ 𝑐), 𝑡 (2.72) 
In this ESCUC model, reserve requirements are not included because all N-1 con-
tingencies, which include generator and non-radial transmission assets, are explicitly in-
corporated through 𝑁1𝑒𝑐 parameter. The result of this unit commitment model is a feasi-
ble N-1 day ahead dispatch solution. 
This model was also modified to take the output of the SCUC, presented in Chap-
ter 2.3, to find the least cost N-1 feasible dispatch solution that could be obtained from 
the commitment solution found by the SCUC. Only one additional constraint was needed 
and is given below in Equation (2.73), which represents constraining the ESCUC model 
to the output of day-ahead commitment solution and is represented by the parameter ?̅?𝑔𝑡. 
The ESCUC model could commit additional generators and was allowed to change the 
dispatch of the entire system accordingly to obtain a feasible N-1 solution. The output of 
this modified model is listed as ESCUC-UC. 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≥ ?̅?𝑔𝑡  ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (2.73) 
In the ESCUC model, (2.59) to (2.72) provide the least costly N-1 reliable solu-
tion. This model still approximates the network with a DCOPF formulation instead of a 
full ACOPF. The model guarantees N-1 security assuming a 10 min time frame. The 
ESCUC-UC is the same formulation as the ESCUC model, with the constraint the only 
addition, as in (2.73), which forces the model to start with the original dispatch solution 
from the SCUC. The ESCUC-UC model subsequently finds the least costly N-1 reliable 
solution for the initial dispatch solution from the SCUC. The results from these models 
are used for comparison purposes with the OMC procedures. 
  27 
2.7 Summary 
The DCOPF represents an approximation of the real power flow throughout the 
transmission network. The approximations made to attain the DCOPF are necessary; oth-
erwise, the SCUC model would not be a mixed integer linear program due to the non-
linear constraints that would have been included through an ACOPF formulation. The 
day-ahead SCUC model presented is similar to what an ISO, RTO, or even a vertically 
integrated utility might use to determine which generators to commit the next day. Other 
formulations could be used. For example, the SCUC formulation used by industry in-
cludes constraint relaxations practices and the effects these practices have on linear pro-
grams was shown. After a SCUC dispatch solution is produced, it can be tested for N-1 
reliability using the contingency analysis model presented in this chapter. Finally, an ex-
tensive-form SCUC that optimizes the base-case (no contingency) while considering 
post-contingency states is reviewed. All models presented in this chapter are used as the 
basis of the research presented throughout this thesis. 
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3. INDUSTRY REVIEW OF CONSTRAINT RELAXATION PRACTICES 
3.1 Introduction 
Electric power grids are among the most complex engineered systems today. To 
ensure a reliable and continuous supply of electric power, operators attempt to control 
their portion of the electric grid in the most efficient manner possible regardless of 
whether the operator works for ISO, RTO, or a vertically integrated utility. Operators 
must manage their generation fleet, which has complex operating requirements, while 
maintaining system synchronism and managing transmission assets throughout their con-
trol area. Operators must also cope with the increasing presence of variable generation 
(e.g., photovoltaic solar and wind power) and limited energy storage capability all while 
meeting stringent reliability standards. The North American Electric Reliability Corpora-
tion (NERC) has many standards guiding operator action. One such required standard is 
N-1 reliability, where the loss of a single generator or non-radial transmission asset does 
not cause involuntary load shedding. NERC states that operators must check for any po-
tential N-1 violations every 30 minutes and if there is a potential violation, regain N-1 
reliability within 30 minutes [25]-[26]. The Western Electric Coordinating Council 
(WECC), a regional authority, advises N-1 reliability be checked every 15 minutes [27]. 
Since N-1 reliability is checked at various time intervals, this standard is not continually 
enforced; furthermore, the operator must regain N-1 reliability 30 minutes after observing 
that the criterion has not been met. As a result, there are situations when operators allow 
short-term violations to occur, but later correct for those violations in order to meet N-1 
requirements. 
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System operators who manage the auction of wholesale energy cannot incorporate 
all of these requirements into their market management systems (MMS) due to the added 
computational complexity. Even with a linearized market, some constraints become too 
costly to meet and create an infeasibility. With the incorporation of constraint relaxations 
into the MMS, operators can attain a market solution. The market solution must then be 
corrected to meet local and federal standards. This must be done regardless of whether or 
not the MMS chooses to relax certain constraints because of all the approximations in-
corporated into the MMS.  
In this report, an investigation is conducted into the current constraint relaxations 
practices utilized by ISOs, the potential market outcomes of these practices, and finally 
their effect on system reliability. 
3.2 Day-Ahead Scheduling Process 
Today, market models can only approximate some of these complex operating, re-
liability, and transmission requirements while trying to optimize the dispatch of the gen-
eration fleet. Even with continued advances in algorithmic performance and hardware, 
such optimization problems continue to require an engineered market structure with vari-
ous approximations that impact the schedule of energy and ancillary services along with 
the corresponding market prices and settlements. Therefore, instead of forcing market 
models to abide by strict, although approximated constraints, market designers choose to 
relax some of these constraints by adding slack variables. However, to discourage the op-
timization algorithm from readily choosing to violate the constraint with no consequence, 
the system must pay a pre-determined penalty price, i.e., the slack variables are incorpo-
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rated into the objective function with a chosen penalty price. Although these practices 
have been approved and implemented today, little is understood regarding the impacts on 
market solutions, reliability, and stability of the system. Furthermore, there has been lim-
ited evaluation of the impacts of such market design practices. 
System operators can potentially receive several benefits from employing con-
straint relaxations practices in market models. First, constraint relaxations allow for the 
potential to obtain gains in market surplus with small relaxations. At times, strictly en-
forcing a constraint, which is an approximation itself, can substantially increase operating 
costs while the enforcement of that constraint to such a stringent requirement may serve a 
minimal purpose. Furthermore, the approximations themselves may result in the optimi-
zation model being infeasible even if a real-world solution were to exist. 
Another benefit of constraint relaxations in market models is that these practices 
allow operators to manage prices. Previously, markets were designed with a bid cap, 
which would limit the bid (the price) that market participants could submit to the market 
for their service. This approach was intended to place a cap (a ceiling) on market prices, 
the locational marginal prices (LMP). To the surprise of early market designers, the 
LMPs were not (and are not) limited by imposing a restriction on the bid values them-
selves; instead, LMPs can be limited by relaxing the node balance constraint with slack 
variables and then placing a penalty on the slack. This makes it more economical to al-
ways have the slack artificially create production at a bus if the delivery cost exceeds the 
penalty price. As a result, the penalty price becomes a cap on the LMP. 
While both MMS and constraint relaxation practices vary among industry mem-
bers, the general process is similar to that shown in Figure 3.1. Details of the different 
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market software tools that ISOs utilize are given in [28]. Initially, ISOs will collect bids 
for the day-ahead market (DAM), where market participants bid to either purchase or 
supply energy and ancillary services. Some participants, typically known as load-serving 
entities (LSEs), purchase energy in the day-ahead market while other participants, known 
as independent power producers (IPPs), sell energy. A virtual bidder could take either 
position in the market. The ISO attempts to maximize the market surplus based on these 
offers relative to operating and reliability requirements. Due to the complexity of these 
requirements, approximations must be made in the market SCUC model. This includes 
using a DCOPF formulation instead of a non-linear ACOPF formulation. Similarly, 
proxy reserve requirements are implemented in an attempt to guarantee N-1 reliability 
instead of explicitly modeling all N-1 scenarios in the SCUC; note that implementing the 
latter creates a stochastic program. Approximations are needed even for smaller systems 
because the computational complexity would increase immensely. Different methods for 
the SCUC are detailed in [29]. 
Even though ISOs approximate operating and reliability requirements in the 
SCUC, these organizations allow constraints to be relaxed. When a constraint is relaxed, 
the market pays a penalty, which must be offset by greater benefits in terms of market 
surplus. Relaxations allow ISOs to obtain solutions that would otherwise be infeasible 
due to approximations made within the SCUC. ISOs then modify the proposed market-
based dispatch solution until a feasible solution is obtained. Most frequently, the solution 
is not AC feasible because of the assumptions made regarding power flow (using a 
DCOPF formulation). Operators will make any changes that are necessary, including 
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running contingency analysis, to obtain a feasible dispatch solution. This process can be 
viewed in Figure 3.2 [16]. 
Once the DAM is solved, awards are given to generators to produce power and 
load-serving entities must pay for power acquired in the day-ahead market. However, 
some LSEs might not have purchased adequate capacity to serve their customers 
throughout the entire day and would have to acquire the additional energy in the real-time 
market. 
To ensure adequate capacity is available during real-time operations, after solving 
the DAM SCUC, ISOs will solve a reliability unit commitment (RUC), also referred to as 
a residual unit commitment problem using an ISO-based forecasted demand and will re-
move all artificial bids from virtual bidders. The RUC is one of many additional steps 
that take place during the adjustment period in the day-ahead scheduling process [11]. A 
natural separation in forward and spot prices can occur because the day-ahead (forward) 
market and RUC are separate and the RUC solution will influence the real-time (spot) 
market [30]. For the purpose of both improving the overall system efficiency as well as 
reducing this potential market distortion, note that at least one ISO (CAISO) is consider-
ing merging their RUC model with their DAM model to create a unified DAM-RUC 
model [31]. 
 
Figure 3.1. General Day-Ahead to Real-Time Market Process Adapted from ERCOT 
[32]. 
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Figure 3.2. Modified Day-Ahead Market Process for MISO [16]. 
The real-time (spot) market opens after the day-ahead market has cleared. During 
real-time operations, ISOs typically solve a SCED problem and the SCED includes con-
straint relaxations as well. The SCED only models a portion of the transmission network 
as the operator will choose what constraints to enforce based on the flags provided by the 
real-time contingency analysis (RTCA) tool and the energy management system (EMS). 
Since the market SCED model also includes constraint relaxations, when the operators 
choose what constraints to model within the SCED, the operator may de-rate transmis-
sion thermal limits (steady-state limits) to ensure the SCED does not result in a constraint 
relaxation that violates the actual steady-state limits; this is possible since the EMS has a 
bias factor built into it that the operator can adjust (the operator can adjust this bias factor 
to de-rate the line’s thermal rating or  can use the bias factor to allow the flow to exceed 
the thermal limit). However, operators managing the SCED may not include all require-
ments so they will have to correct for approximations and relaxations. For example, if a 
transmission line’s flow is close to its limit, the EMS will warn the operator that actions 
are necessary to correct for the violations to ensure that the system is secure, including 
de-rating the transmission line the next time the operator runs the SCED. 
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3.3 California Independent System Operator (CAISO) 
CAISO has both a forward market and a spot market for energy transactions 
known as the Integrated-Forward Market (IFM) and the Real-time Market (RTM), re-
spectively [1]. As part of their day-ahead procedures, CAISO also runs a RUC. CAISO 
applies constraint relaxations in all three stages. In both markets operated by CAISO, the 
IFM and RTM are solved twice. The first time either market is solved is known as the 
“scheduling-run,” for which CAISO applies large penalty prices to ensure that the market 
attempts to utilize the bids posted by the market participants before relaxing any of the 
constraints [9]. The outputs of the scheduling runs are used to determine the dispatch 
schedule. The results are then passed to the pricing run where only small deviations from 
the scheduling run’s dispatch schedule are allowed. The pricing run is different as the 
penalty prices are much lower in the pricing run. For example, within both the IFM and 
RTM, the energy/node balance constraint can be relaxed at a penalty price of 
$6,500/MWh within the scheduling run; however, when solving the pricing run, the pen-
alty is lowered to $500/MWh. As such, the scheduling run can be interpreted to deter-
mine the primal solution (dispatch schedule) while the pricing run is used to determine 
the dual solution (the market prices) [33]. While this procedure has been approved by the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and agreed upon by the stakeholders in 
CAISO, this could be seen as price distortion. The scheduling run is being determined 
with constraint relaxations based on higher penalty prices; the resulting primal solution is 
kept the same but the resulting prices from the scheduling run are not used even though 
those prices are based on the dual solution that corresponds to the scheduling run’s primal 
solution. Instead, the prices are based on what comes from the pricing run, where there 
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are much lower penalty prices, resulting in much lower price caps (i.e., this is done for 
the purpose of price control).  
After obtaining results from the scheduling and pricing run, CAISO solves a RUC 
model to ensure adequate capacity is acquired for the next day. Like the IFM, the RUC 
includes constraint relaxations, including the relaxation of the energy/node balance con-
straint and transmission limit constraints.  
Due to the approximations made in these models, CAISO has to perform “excep-
tional dispatches” to guarantee reliability. In 2011 and 2012, CAISO paid out $43 and 
$34 million, respectively, for exceptional dispatches. CAISO even recognized that some 
of the constraint relaxation practices utilized in their markets could have resulted from 
the need for exceptional dispatches [14]. 
3.4 Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) 
MISO’s reach is the largest among ISOs in North America [34]. Once MISO de-
termines the cleared energy and ancillary services from the DAM SCUC, operators sub-
sequently check system reliability by performing contingency analysis. The resulting 
output from the contingency analysis is reviewed. If operators determine the day-ahead 
schedule is unreliable, the operator will either choose to resolve the SCUC or perform an 
out-of-market correction [16], [35]-[36]. 
After the MISO DAM process is completed and the schedule has been approved, 
MISO begins the process anew with the reliability assessment commitment (RAC), also 
known as a RUC. Similarly, MISO uses their version of the RUC to commit additional 
generation capacity to ensure adequate supply for the next operating day. 
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During the RTM, MISO solves a SCED to re-dispatch generators to fulfill de-
mand and manage congestion. Due to time constraints, operators will ignore certain con-
straints, which might include ignoring portions of the transmission network. As a result, 
violations could occur in real-time. MISO has indicated that operators will attempt to 
avoid violations by manually de-rating line ratings when solving the SCED to avoid over-
loads that could be violated due to the constraint relaxation procedures [37].  
Previously, MISO discontinued the use of a “constraint relaxation algorithm” 
[38]-[39]. In [40], the authors state that the constraint relaxation procedures artificially 
decrease the actual congestion present in the system during real-time operations. Today 
within SCED, constraints are assigned marginal value limits (MVL), which is the same as 
applying a penalty price. The MVL caps the dual variable of the corresponding con-
straint. MISO has declared these values in [40]. 
In [41], MISO has updated some of the MVLs to staircase demand curves. For 
example, a transmission line with a voltage level greater than 161kV has an MVL of 
$1000/MWh when the constraint exceeds its limit until it reaches 102% of its rating. 
Above that level, the model sets the penalty price at $2000/MWh. Transmission lines at 
other levels have different MVL prices, but still exhibit a stepwise curve. 
3.5 Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) 
The DAM managed by ERCOT, which acquires energy and ancillary services 
[32], is solved by utilizing a multi-hour mixed integer programming algorithm that seeks 
to maximize market surplus for the entire day. The DAM is a unit commitment optimiza-
tion problem that utilizes constraint relaxation practices similar to other ISOs and where 
  37 
the market penalizes the system when violating these constraints, typically with a set 
penalty price.  
However, ERCOT uses a different constraint relaxation structure with its node 
balance constraint. Like other ISOs, it can be violated either positively, when more gen-
eration is acquired artificially, or negatively, when generation is reduced artificially. 
However, unlike other ISOs, violations are penalized via a step-wise function [5]. The 
penalty prices for transmission constraints are dependent on the voltage level. Further-
more, ERCOT stipulates that the penalty factors used in the DAM can be set (adjusted) 
by the operator. Similar practices occur in real-time operations [42]. 
3.6 New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) 
NYISO employs constraint relaxation practices in both their SCUC and real-time 
scheduling models by utilizing demand curves that reflect scarcity [43] and serve the 
same purpose as constraint relaxations used for price control. Some of these demand 
curves are either fixed or stepped. For instance, NYISO sets a “Demand Curve Price” of 
4000 $/MWh for relaxing any transmission constraint. Conversely, the price for relaxing 
the 30-minute reserve requirement in the New York Control Area is stepped, i.e., for the 
first 200 MW, the system pays a penalty price of 50 $/MWh, for the next 200 MW, the 
system pays 100 $/MWh, and for the rest, the system pays 200 $/MWh [43]-[44]. The 
NYISO operator may acquire additional reserve in real-time at any quantity or price point 
[44]. 
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3.7 Independent System Operator of New England (ISO-NE) 
ISO-NE also utilizes constraint relaxations in their market operations. Specifical-
ly, ISO-NE implements penalty prices for reserves, known as “reserve constraint penalty 
factors.” The constraints for different reserve products have different prices. For example, 
relaxing the 10-minute non-spinning reserve requirement previously cost 850 $/MWh, 
but now costs the system 1,500 $/MWh. Additionally, the 30-minute operating reserve 
was priced at 500 $/MWh, but now costs 1,000 $/MWh [45]. 
ISO-NE relaxes other constraints, but provides little detail regarding such practic-
es. In [28], it is stated that the relaxation of transmission constraints occurs in a separate 
process that includes very high penalties. Furthermore, in [46], ISO-NE discusses the 
consequences of allowing for constraint relaxations; in the example provided, ISO-NE 
shows that relaxations on interface limits among the northeastern ISOs allows cheaper 
generation from other ISOs to be dispatched. 
3.8 Pennsylvania Jersey Maryland Interconnection (PJM) 
PJM utilizes constraint relaxation practices similar to that of other ISOs, where 
one set penalty price for each constraint is applied. According to [28], these penalty pric-
es included a cost of 1000 $/MWh for the power balance constraint, 50,000 $/MWh for 
ramping constraints, 5000 $/MWh for normal and emergency operation constraints, and 
1000 $/MWh for transmission constraints. 
In [47], penalty prices have been updated by PJM. This includes the penalty price 
for primary and synchronized reserves in each region, which is set to 850 $/MWh be-
cause PJM witnessed reserve costs exceeding 800 $/MWh regularly during peak hours. 
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Furthermore, PJM states that it has a bid cap of 1000 $/MWh and a maximum LMP of 
2700 $/MWh. 
During previous conference calls with industry participants, PJM indicated a need 
to analyze the consequences of these relaxations practices. PJM has even indicated that 
relaxations at times can occur in actual operations due to inadequate procurement of ca-
pacity or when operators are not concerned about short-term overloads on particular con-
straints [37]. 
3.9 Summary 
 Reliable and economic deployment of a generation fleet to satisfy demand is a 
complex problem. ISOs and RTOs solve complex unit commitment and economic dis-
patch models to determine appropriate resources to deploy at various time stages. Due to 
the complexity of power systems, several approximations are made within optimization 
models, including approximations of the transmission network with a linearized formula-
tion known as the DCOPF instead of the more realistic ACOPF formulation. Further-
more, approximations occur in these models by relaxing specific constraints in the model, 
i.e., the constraint is allowed to be violated based on a predetermined penalty price. By 
doing so, the ISO/RTO receives several benefits, including the ability to manage prices 
and clear the market as well as the potential to obtain gains in social welfare (market sur-
plus). This work presented describes the constraint relaxation practices of ISOs in their 
unit commitment models and analyzes the corresponding consequences resulting from 
these practices. 
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4. EFFECT OF CONSTRAINT RELAXATION PRACTICES ON MARKET 
OUTCOMES 
4.1 Introduction 
 ISOs apply constraint relaxations to several constraints throughout the scheduling 
process. In this thesis, two test cases have been used to analyze the potential impacts con-
straint relaxations have on market outcomes. The first test case used is the RTS-96 test 
case [48]. A day-ahead SCUC is formulated and solved with and without constraint re-
laxations. The only constraint relaxations applied to the RTS-96 test case study was on 
line flow limits. The resulting market dispatch solutions were subsequently modified uti-
lizing tools within PSS/E to achieve an AC feasible and N-1 reliable dispatch schedule. 
At this point, a comparison is performed on how the modifications made with the tools 
within PSS/E affect potential market outcomes. This comparison is performed by calcu-
lating the settlements from the market LMPs, which are from the SCUC market model, 
and the ex-post LMPs after all corrections were made to the market solution, as shown by 
Figure 4.1. 
The second test case used to evaluate constraint relaxations is based upon data 
provided by PJM. With this test case, a SCUC is solved similar to that used for the RTS-
96 test case; however, it is only solved for two separate time periods, an on-peak and off-
peak hour and, as before, the test case is solved with and without relaxations. The test 
case is solved with the original penalty prices used by PJM, which resulted in fewer re-
laxations, and a set of lower penalty prices. For the PJM study, both the node balance 
constraints and the line flow limit constraints are relaxed. The resulting dispatches are 
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corrected for AC and N-1 feasibility and a comparison of market settlements is performed 
based on the market LMPs. 
 
Figure 4.1. Two Stage Process to Achieve AC and N-1 Feasible Dispatch Solution. 
4.2 Security Constrained Unit Commitment with Key Constraint Relaxations 
The SCUC objective (4.1) is to minimize the total system cost while using a line-
ar-piecewise cost curve that requires the segmentation of the power output of the genera-
tors, which is exhibited in (4.2)-(4.4). The proxy reserve requirements (4.5)-(4.12) are 
based on CAISO’s rules [22]. They specify that the total reserve must be greater than the 
largest contingency, (4.5), as well as greater than a combination of load (𝛼) and load met 
by non-hydro resources (𝛽), (4.6). In [22], CAISO specifies that operating reserves must 
exceed 5% of the load met by hydro resources and 7% of load met by non-hydro, which 
translates to 𝛼 = 0.05, 𝛽 = 0.02 in (3.6). The total reserve reflects the spinning and non-
spinning reserve, (4.7), and at least half of the operating reserve must come from spin-
ning reserves, (4.8). While these rules are based on CAISO’s rules, these reserve re-
quirement rules are similar to the rules used by many system operators.  
Additional generator constraints include minimum up- and down-time as well as 
ramp rate requirements. Note that while the startup and shutdown variables are binary, 
prior work has proven that with (4.13)-(4.15) and (4.25), it is possible to treat these bina-
Adjustment Process
DAM SCUC
(Market 
Model LMPs)
AC and N-1 
Solution
(Ex-Post LMPs)
PSS/E – ACOPF
Commit 
Additional 
Units
PSS/E - PSCOPF
Yes
NoNo
Yes
Commit 
Additional 
Units
Market 
Data
  42 
ry variables as continuous variables, i.e., (4.23)-(4.24), and still guarantee a binary solu-
tion for the startup and shutdown variables [27]. Finally, in the DCOPF formulation, the 
line flow is calculated with the PTDFs where the total power flow into or out of a bus is 
represented by a net-injection variable, denoted as 𝑃𝑛𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗. The unit commitment could have 
its line flow constraints violated, accomplished by the addition of the slack variables 𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑘+ 
and 𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑘−. If these slack variables are anything other than zero, the objective is penalized by 
the penalty price, 𝑃𝑃𝐾, which is set to $100/MWh within this formulation. This SCUC is 
solved with and without line limit constraint relaxations using the RTS-96 test case [27]. 
min ∑ ∑ ∑ (𝑐𝑔𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑃𝑔𝑖𝑡)𝑖𝑡𝑔 + ∑ ∑ (𝑐𝑔
𝑁𝐿𝑢𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝑈𝑣𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝐷𝑤𝑔𝑡)𝑡𝑔 + ∑ ∑ 𝑃
𝐾(𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑘+ + 𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑘−)𝑡𝑘   
 (4.1) 
𝑃𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑔𝑡𝑃𝑔𝑖
𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 ∀𝑔, 𝑖 = 1, 𝑡  (4.2) 
0 ≤ 𝑃𝑔𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑢𝑔𝑡𝑃𝑔𝑖
𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 ∀𝑔, 𝑖 > 1, 𝑡 (4.3) 
𝑃𝑔𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = ∑ 𝑃𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖  ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (4.4) 
𝑃𝑔𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑆𝑃 ≤ 𝑟𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑞
 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (4.5) 
𝑟𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑞 ≥ 𝛼 ∑ 𝑃𝑔𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑔 + 𝛽 ∑ 𝑃𝑔𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑔𝜖𝐻(𝑔)=0  ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (4.6) 
𝑟𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑞 ≤ ∑ (𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑆𝑃 + 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑁𝑆)𝑔  ∀𝑡 (4.7) 
0.5𝑟𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑞 ≤ ∑ 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑆𝑃
𝑔  ∀𝑡 (4.8) 
0 ≤ 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑆𝑃 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑃𝑔𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (4.9) 
𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑆𝑃 ≤ 𝑅𝑔
10𝑢𝑔𝑡 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (4.10) 
0 ≤ 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑁𝑆 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥(1 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡) ∀𝐹𝑆𝑔 = 1, 𝑔, 𝑡 (4.11) 
𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑁𝑆 ≤ 𝑅𝑔
10(1 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡) ∀𝐹𝑆𝑔 = 1, 𝑔, 𝑡 (4.12) 
𝑣𝑔𝑡 − 𝑤𝑔𝑡 = 𝑢𝑔𝑡 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡−1 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (4.13) 
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∑ 𝑣𝑔𝑠+𝑇
𝑡
𝑠=𝑡−𝑈𝑇𝑔+1 + ∑ 𝑣𝑔𝑠
𝑡
𝑠=𝑡−𝑈𝑇𝑔+1 ≤ 𝑢𝑔𝑡 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (4.14) 
∑ 𝑤𝑔𝑠+𝑇
𝑡
𝑠=𝑡−𝐷𝑇𝑔+1 + ∑ 𝑤𝑔𝑠
𝑡
𝑠=𝑡−𝑈𝑇𝑔+1 ≤ 1 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (4.15) 
𝑢𝑔𝑡−1𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅 + 𝑣𝑔𝑡𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≥ 𝑃𝑔𝑡
total − 𝑃𝑔𝑡−1
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (4.16) 
𝑢𝑔𝑡𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅 + 𝑤𝑔𝑡𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≥ 𝑃𝑔𝑡−1
total − 𝑃𝑔𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (4.17) 
−𝑃𝑛𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗 + ∑ 𝑃𝑔𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑔∈𝑔(𝑛) = 𝑑𝑛𝑡 ∀𝑛, 𝑡 (4.18) 
∑ 𝑃𝑛𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛𝑘
𝑅𝐸𝐹
𝑛 ≤ 𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑘+ ∀𝑘, 𝑡 (4.19) 
−𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑘− ≤ ∑ 𝑃𝑛𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛𝑘
𝑅𝐸𝐹
𝑛  ∀𝑘, 𝑡 (4.20) 
∑ 𝑃𝑛𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑛 = 0 ∀𝑡 (4.21) 
0 ≤ 𝑣𝑔𝑡 ≤ 1 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (4.22) 
0 ≤ 𝑤𝑔𝑡 ≤ 1 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (4.23) 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑘+, 𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑘− ≥ 0 ∀n, 𝑘, 𝑡 (4.24) 
𝑢𝑔𝑡𝜖{0,1} ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (4.25) 
4.3 RTS-96 Test Case 
A modified version of the RTS-96 test case [27] was used to solve the SCUC unit 
commitment with line thermal limit relaxations. These modifications include reducing the 
transmission thermal limits by ten percent without including the HVDC line. Further-
more, for the purposes of this simulation, the load for the peak day was increased by ten 
percent as well. These actions were taken to increase the number of relaxations the SCUC 
market model obtained with relaxations. 
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After the initial SCUC was solved with and without relaxations, these market dis-
patch solutions were corrected for AC and N-1 feasibility. Part of this requirement was to 
ensure that the voltage deviated no more than +/- 5% of voltage rating. 
4.4 PJM Test Case 
Using a similar formulation, a SCUC is solved for an on- and off-peak hour, 
based on a 15,000 bus test case of the PJM system including actual market data from var-
ious operating days. Areas outside PJM were included to accurately account for the tie-
line flows. In total, there were over 20,000 lines that appeared in the PJM data set, but 
ratings were only enforced for lines at or above 138kV. While PJM relaxes many differ-
ent constraints within their market model, the focus is on relaxation of line limits and 
node balance constraints. These relaxations were penalized in the model with two sets of 
penalty prices: i) with the original PJM penalty prices of 1000 $/MWh and 2700 $/MWh 
and ii) with a lower set of 100 $/MWh and 250 $/MWh for the line limits and node bal-
ance constraints, respectively. Finally, the reserve requirements are modified to resemble 
those of PJM [49]. The reserve requirements include acquiring total reserve (spinning and 
non-spinning reserve), which must be at least 150% of the single largest generator con-
tingency. At least half of the total reserve must be spinning reserve and the total spinning 
reserve must be greater than the largest generator. The other reserve requirements are 
similar to those in the previous formulation, which include (4.10)-(4.12). 
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4.5 Correction Process to Attain AC and N-1 Feasibility 
To attain a base-case AC feasible solution that has no voltage or transmission vio-
lations, the PSS/E optimal power flow (OPF) package was used. Market dispatch solu-
tions with and without constraint relaxations are the initial starting point for the AC pow-
er flow, which utilizes network controls, such as switchable shunts and transformers’ tap 
settings. In some peak load cases, the adjustment of network controls is not sufficient 
and, thus, additional units must be committed in order to eliminate large reactive power 
mismatches.  
The approximations incorporated within the market model were corrected by us-
ing PSS/E’s ACOPF. Using an ACOPF, which assimilates market data and minimizes 
cost while utilizing shunts and taps controls, ensured that AC related quantities, such as 
reactive current flow, losses, and voltage limits, were incorporated in the new base-case 
AC solution. All violations of any defined limits were removed. This process is the first 
step of the adjustment process in Figure 4.1. 
The new AC dispatch solutions provided a feasible base-case solution with no vi-
olations. However, N-1 contingency analysis revealed that the system was susceptible to 
various voltage and flow violations following certain contingencies. Additional correc-
tions to AC dispatch solutions were required in order to achieve an N-1 reliable solution.  
To implement these preventive actions, the following control options were used: 
switchable shunts, transformers’ tap setting adjustments, dispatched generators’ active 
and reactive power output, and committing offline generators. An AC N-1 contingency 
analysis was performed to identify the most severe contingencies that needed to be con-
sidered in the preventive correction process. Post-contingency violations were subse-
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quently removed using the previously stated control actions; post-contingency limits for 
voltages were set to ±5% deviation from rated values for the RTS-96 test case and ±20% 
for the PJM test case. In both cases, line flows were permitted to exceed their thermal rat-
ings by 25%. Contingency analysis was performed again to confirm the effectiveness of 
the corrective actions and ensure that other contingencies had not been negatively affect-
ed. This iterative process was automated throughout this work using the built-in preven-
tive security constrained OPF (PSCOPF) feature in PSS/E. Using PSCOPF also ensured 
consistency in identifying preventive corrective actions [50]. The result of this process 
was the achievement of not only AC feasible, but also N-1 reliable dispatch solutions and 
is the final step in Figure 4.1. The correction process described in this section was per-
formed by fellow Ph.D. student Ahmed Salloum. 
4.6 Market Implications 
To demonstrate the impact of constraint relaxation practices, the deterministic 
unit commitment program was solved with and without relaxations. The mipgap used to 
solve these unit commitment programs was set to 1%. Two distinct test cases (RTS-96 
and PJM) were used to evaluate the possible market impacts of these relaxation practices. 
4.6.1 RTS-96 Test Case Results 
The first test case used was the RTS-96 test case, which was solved twice based 
on (4.1)-(4.25): once without relaxations (SCUC) and once with relaxations (SCUC-CR). 
The relaxed transmission limits produced from this program are given in Table 4.1.  
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The dispatch solutions produced by the SCUC and SCUC-CR solutions are nei-
ther AC feasible nor N-1 reliable. After correcting both of these dispatch solutions to at-
tain AC feasibility and N-1 reliability, system settlements were calculated with the mar-
ket model LMPs (i.e., the LMPs that would come out of the market model and corre-
spond to the approximate solution that is neither N-1 feasible nor AC feasible) and then 
again with the final dispatch solution LMPs (i.e., the marginal cost to deliver one MW 
after all post-market corrections are established, which reflects ex-post LMP pricing 
[51]). Table 4.2 presents these three sets of solutions for both cases with and without con-
straint relaxations; the original market SCUC solutions are presented along with the N-1 
corrected solutions, which are both AC feasible and N-1 reliable. 
Table 4.1. Relaxed Transmission Line Limits Produced by SCUC-CR. 
Line Time Period Relaxed Amount Above Rating (MW) Percentage (above rating) 
25 22 9.96 3.2% 
65 7 32.21 10.3% 
65 23 25.98 8.3% 
104 7 14.18 4.5% 
104 8 15.85 5.0% 
104 23 16.92 5.4% 
 
The system settlements, particularly for generators, were determined for these so-
lutions and can be seen in Table 4.2. There is a slight difference in the total system cost in 
the SCUC and SCUC-CR solutions. Note that the total system cost for the SCUC-CR so-
lution includes the penalty cost for relaxing transmission limit constraints. Since the solu-
tion from SCUC-CR was able to produce constraint relaxations, it produced a cheaper 
solution compared to the SCUC solution with no relaxations. These results emulated 
those produced from market models employed today. 
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The market solution for the SCUC had a resulting optimality gap of 0.27%; the 
SCUC solution’s lower bound is higher than the best incumbent solution obtained for the 
SCUC-CR market solution, whose resulting optimality gap was 0.1%. While the SCUC-
CR optimal solution must be as cheap, if not cheaper, than the non-relaxed solution, there 
is no guarantee that the incumbent solution will be cheaper if the problems are not solved 
to optimality. Even though the market models are not solved to optimality today due to 
time restrictions, it is still expected that the relaxed solution has a lower market cost. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that such a solution involves relaxations, which 
are considered to be actual violations. Therefore, the emphasis needs to be placed on the 
actual cost to operate an AC feasible and N-1 reliable system, which are the costs after all 
of the corrections have been made.  
Comparing the two AC feasible and N-1 reliable solutions, the solution with re-
laxations had a lower system cost than the solution without relaxations. The difference in 
total cost was approximately $245,000, or roughly 5%, over the entire day, much larger 
than the difference in the market solution costs of 0.3%. The final difference in costs 
(5%) between the two solutions is not due to just the relaxations but is obviously also de-
pendent on the corrections made within the adjustment phase. While the adjustment 
phase itself is imprecise (i.e., due to the complexity, an optimal adjustment is not deter-
mined), this process replicates industry practices and it is important to capture whether 
the practice of constraint relaxations increases the reliance on out-of-market corrections. 
This issue is left for further review in the discussion section of Chapter 4.6.3. 
The day-ahead SCUC solution (without relaxations) exhibited a cost increase of 
$700,000 between the original market solution and the final corrected solution that is AC 
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feasible and N-1 reliable. The day-ahead SCUC-CR solution (with relaxations) exhibited 
a lower increase in cost between the original market solution and the final AC feasible 
and N-1 reliable solution, a cost of only $490,000. This result is somewhat counterintui-
tive; it may be expected that the solution with relaxed constraints would cost more to ob-
tain a proper AC feasible and N-1 solution. However, this result intriguingly shows that 
this is not always the case. When there are two infeasible solutions, it is not possible to 
guarantee which solution will cost less to correct to achieve feasibility. A solution with 
more overall relaxations may very well be cheaper once feasibility is achieved. This re-
sult also then translates to the SCUC-CR solution having a lower overall cost, meaning 
that this practice improves the overall social welfare even after all corrections have been 
made. While this is only one result, it roughly confirms one argument in support of con-
straint relaxations: it is questionable to impose such strict requirements when the model 
itself is a rough approximation. 
With all the corrections made to both dispatch solutions, generator profit de-
creased as expected. When utilizing the ex-post LMPs that reflect the implemented out-
of-market changes made to guarantee AC feasibility and N-1 reliability (during the day-
ahead scheduling process), the generators were able to make a profit with the final SCUC 
dispatch solution. However, the final solution for the SCUC-CR indicated that generators 
would incur a loss over the entire 24-hour time horizon. Note this profit is determined by 
LMP payments alone and does not include the subsequent uplift payments, whose calcu-
lation is similar to that in [36]. This would only occur if there were no deviation during 
real-time operations. Today, operators post day-ahead market results based upon the orig-
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inal LMPs from the day-ahead market model. In this case, both dispatch solutions exhib-
ited generators making a profit over the entire operating day. 
Table 4.2. Market Results in ($k for tested peak day) for SCUC-CR and SCUC. 
SCUC-CR market solution and resulting N-1 corrected solution 
 
Total 
Cost 
Gen. Reve-
nue 
Uplift 
Gen. Profit + 
Uplift 
Market SCUC Solution 4,082 11,457 297 7,684 
N-1 Corrected (Market Model 
LMPs) 
4,557 11,682 564 7,688 
N-1 Corrected (Ex-Post LMPs) 4,557 4,456 2,071 1,969 
SCUC market solution and resulting N-1 corrected solution 
Market SCUC Solution 4,095 11,518 303 7,726 
N-1 Corrected (Market Model 
LMPs) 
4,803 11,734 799 7,730 
N-1 Corrected (Ex-Post LMPs) 4,803 5,391 2,103 2,691 
 
If the day-ahead market settlements were based on LMPs after the out-of-market 
corrections are performed during the day-ahead scheduling process (analogous to ex-post 
real-time pricing), then the generator revenue and profit would be much lower (compared 
to market model LMPs) for both cases with and without constraint relaxations. The uplift 
payments are also much higher with ex-post pricing. The results provide a mechanism to 
analyze how market settlements are impacted when constraints are relaxed within the 
market model but are later corrected outside of the market (auction) engine by operators. 
These results first show that the main impacts on settlements are not primarily the con-
straint relaxations that occur but the inaccuracies within the market models associated 
with not having an ACOPF or an explicit representation of all contingencies. This can be 
observed since both results with and without constraint relaxation have substantially low-
er generator profits after the correction phase; note, however, that such results do not 
guarantee this as a general outcome. Nevertheless, there is still a difference between the 
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solutions that employ constraints relaxations and those that do not. Furthermore, the prac-
tice of constraint relaxations influences system operating costs, as shown in Table 4.2. 
4.6.2 PJM Test Case Results 
 Extending the analysis performed on the RTS-96 test case, another test case was 
constructed from data provided by PJM. A single period SCUC model, with and without 
relaxations, was solved for an off-peak and on-peak period. The market solutions were 
then modified to achieve AC and N-1 feasibility. Additionally, SCUC-CR was solved 
with line limit relaxations and node balance relaxations for two sets of penalty prices: i) 
with lower prices of 100 $/MWh and 250 $/MWh and ii) with PJM’s original penalty 
prices of 1000 $/MWh and 2700 $/MWh for line limit and nodal relaxations respectively. 
Note that when a nodal relaxation occurs in the model, the dual variable (LMP) is limited 
by the penalty price. In the SCUC model solution, no relaxations were allowed and, thus, 
the highest LMPs exhibited in the system were $1473 and $2754 for the off- and on-peak 
hours, respectively.  
For the off-peak hour, the SCUC-CR solution, with lower penalty prices resulted 
in 57 MW of nodal relaxations, less than 0.1% of demand. The total line limit relaxations 
for the off-peak hour were 743 MW on nine lines. Furthermore, when solving with the 
SCUC-CR model for the off-peak hour, the model chose not to relax any constraints with 
the original penalty prices.  
For the on-peak hour, the SCUC-CR with lower penalty prices chose a greater 
amount of nodal relaxations, approximately 5400 MW. These relaxations occurred but 
were not limited to the areas controlled by PJM (i.e., some relaxations occurred outside 
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of PJM’s territory due to model approximations). These nodal relaxations represent 3.5% 
of the total load for PJM’s system and the outside areas that were also represented during 
the on-peak hour. Furthermore, due to these nodal relaxations, the LMP is limited only to 
$250 at several nodes, thereby controlling prices. The market chose to relax eight lines 
for the line thermal limit relaxations, but only overloaded these lines by a total of 490 
MW. Unlike the RTS-96 test case results, the initial gap between the market solutions is 
much greater when comparing the SCUC and SCUC-CR solutions with the lowered pen-
alty prices. The difference in total system cost between the initial market solutions for 
off- and on-peak hours are 3.9% and 8.3%, respectively, with the SCUC-CR solutions 
being cheaper. The difference in total system costs between the final AC and N-1 feasible 
solutions for the off- and on-peak hours are 10% and 2.5%, respectively, this time with 
the SCUC solutions being cheaper. For market solutions with relaxations, the off- and on-
peak hours required changes to the dispatch solution to the point that the total system cost 
changed dramatically. While the penalty prices are lower than what PJM employs, these 
results demonstrate what can happen to the costs and market settlements once an infeasi-
ble solution with relaxations is corrected by the operator.  
When the on-peak hour is solved with the original penalty prices (2700 $/MWh 
for node and 1000 $/MWh for line relaxations), the SCUC-CR solution had a relaxation 
of 340 MW total on seven lines. There were no nodal relaxations because the highest 
LMP obtained only reached $905 because the model was able to find a cheaper cost solu-
tion with only line relaxations. As expected, the relaxed market solutions produce lower 
overall costs than the market solutions without relaxations. The initial SCUC-CR market 
solution only has a 1.3% difference with the cost of the initial market SCUC solution. 
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With the original penalty prices, few relaxations occur, and the relaxations that did occur 
were not due to feasibility requirements, because a solution was obtainable without relax-
ations in this test case, but rather to the economic benefit of relaxing the constraint for the 
specified penalty price. Finally, the overall total cost after obtaining AC feasibility and N-
1 reliability is higher for the relaxed market solution compared to the market solution 
without relaxations. While such a result is not guaranteed, a solution with relaxations is 
expected to cost more in the end, as the relaxed solution is likely to rely more on costly 
out-of-market corrections by the operator. Additional results regarding market settle-
ments can be seen in Table 4.3 and in Figure 4.2, which further demonstrate how con-
straint relaxation practices can substantially influence market settlements.  
When comparing market solutions, for the on-peak hour between the two SCUC-
CR models with low penalty prices and the original penalty prices, the initial market so-
lution corresponding to the low penalty price model was approximately 7% cheaper than 
the SCUC-CR with the original penalty prices. The low penalty price model has a penalty 
on the node balance constraint of 250 $/MWh, which causes this result. While the lower 
penalty price market-based solution will have a cheaper market-based cost (higher market 
surplus), both solutions must be corrected to achieve an N-1 AC feasible solution. After 
correcting these dispatch solutions to achieve AC and N-1 feasibility, the final cost for 
the SCUC-CR with low penalties was cheaper only by 0.9%. There were far more correc-
tions required for the SCUC-CR solution with low penalties due to the high number of 
nodal relaxations (5400 MW) as well as 490 MW of line relaxations. In comparison, the 
SCUC-CR solution with the original penalty prices had no nodal relaxations and 340 
MW of line relaxations. Such a result demonstrates that while the penalty prices may be 
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substantially lower to produce a market solution that is more efficient, the actual efficien-
cy gains may still be modest; solutions with more relaxations are naturally expected to 
require more corrections. 
The two market solutions are also distinguishable as the low penalty price model 
substantially limits the LMPs to 250 $/MWh since the LMP cap is much lower, so there 
is an obvious difference in the settlements. The results also show that there is a much 
wider range of LMPs across the system. For instance, for the on-peak hour, the SCUC 
solution without relaxations has a standard deviation for the LMPs above 100, the SCUC-
CR with the original penalties has a standard deviation at roughly 70, and the low penalty 
case has a standard deviation at about 15. The congestion rent in the low penalty case is 
also half of the congestion rent for the original penalty case. Another important result is 
that the uplift payments are also much higher for the case with a low penalty price; lower-
ing the price cap then reduces profits and more generators need to receive a side payment 
(uplift) as a result. Thus, the original prices result in much higher settlements, which in-
clude generator revenue, generator profit, congestion rent, and load payment. The results 
in Figure 4.2 and Table 4.3 illustrate how the chosen prices influence settlements dramat-
ically while the costs to operate the system do not experience such a wide variation be-
tween the results. Constraint relaxation is thus shown to be very influential in settlements 
as well as imposing price control. 
It should be noted that the difference in total system cost between the market solu-
tion and its corresponding AC and N-1 feasible solution is likely greater than what would 
be expected. Commercial-grade MMS are tailored to the system to account for system 
specific limitations to improve the approximation of the SCUC model (e.g., the inclusion 
  55 
of reliability must run units or nomograms). Thus, the market solution should be closer to 
the final solution than that reported within this work. Nevertheless, the comparative re-
sults with the same SCUC model except for relaxations demonstrate that constraint relax-
ations can substantially impact market settlements. 
Note that to obtain AC feasibility and N-1 reliability, additional units are only 
committed after all other control options have been exhausted. For the off-peak hour, the 
PJM SCUC market results required an additional 14 generators to achieve AC and N-1 
feasibility whereas the PJM SCUC-CR market results with low penalties required 28 ad-
ditional generators. For the on-peak hour to achieve AC and N-1 feasibility, the PJM 
SCUC market results required 22 generators to be committed and PJM SCUC-CR with 
low penalties required 74 generators. For the latter results where the relaxed case needed 
what seemed to be an abnormally high amount of additional generators, this amount only 
accounted for an additional 7% of generation. Regarding the PJM SCUC-CR with origi-
nal penalties, this market solution required an additional 62 generators to be committed to 
attain AC and N-1 feasibility. 
As for generator revenue, every scenario exhibited an increase when comparing 
the initial market solution and the final AC and N-1 feasible solution based upon market 
LMPs; this is due to the fact that additional units are committed while the market settle-
ments for generators committed based on the market solution are maintained. The uplift 
payments also increase as well. The highest increase is exhibited for the on-peak hour 
when the market solution was initially relaxed with the lower penalty prices. The greatest 
increase in profit occurred for the on-peak hour when no relaxations were allowed. Both 
relaxed market solutions result in higher costs in the end than the solution without relaxa-
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tions; however, the generation revenue, generation profit, and load payments are all lower 
for the relaxed solutions. This is, in part, a result of the fact that relaxations cap market 
clearing prices. These results can be viewed in Table 4.3 as well as in Figure 4.2. 
Table 4.3. Market Results for PJM Market and Resulting N-1 Final Feasible Solutions 
($k per hour tested). 
 Time  
Period 
Total Cost Gen.  
Revenue 
Uplift Gen. Prof-
it + Uplift 
SCUC (no relaxations) 
Market Off 5,720 10,601 948 5,829 
On 16,649 42,255 63 25,669 
N-1 Feasible Off 10,499 11,852 5,547 6,899 
On 22,529 44,665 4,910 27,045 
SCUC-CR low penalty prices 
Market Off 5,499 10,602 43 5,235 
On 15,329 31,781 96 17,961 
N-1 Feasible Off 11,620 11,452 5,939 5,771 
On 23,106 35,147 6,700 18,740 
SCUC-CR PJM original penalty prices 
Market On 16,431 40,194 23 23,819 
N-1 Feasible On 23,315 42,695 4,879 24,259 
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Figure 4.2. System Settlement Results for Both On- and Off-Peak Hours, with and with-
out Relaxations; Generator Revenue, Generator Profit, and Load Payment Include the 
Uplift Payments. 
4.6.3 Discussion 
 When the market model involves constraint relaxations, the optimal solution to 
the SCUC-CR model is at least as good, if not better, than the optimal solution of the 
SCUC model without relaxations. However, the simulations conducted for this study 
demonstrate that it is not possible to conclude what method will produce a lower cost at 
the final stage of the process after each solution is modified to be AC feasible and N-1 
reliable. While the SCUC-CR solution is considered to be infeasible due to the relaxa-
tions, both solutions are infeasible due to the DC approximation and the proxy reserve 
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requirements that do not guarantee N-1. The results show that the final solutions are not 
just dependent on the solution produced by the market engine but that they are also de-
pendent on the procedures taken to modify the solutions to get reliable solutions. Overall, 
the results demonstrate that it may not be beneficial to have an overly precise market 
model since the market model has other approximations embedded in it anyway. One re-
sult demonstrates the final cost ($23,315k) for the PJM market solution with PJM’s origi-
nal relaxation prices that resulted in minimal relaxations is higher than the final cost 
($23,106k) for the PJM market solution with much lower relaxation prices while having 
many more relaxations in the market solution. 
On the other hand, having more relaxations in the market solution can result in 
more corrections needed outside the market environment. For the PJM on-peak hour, the 
market solution that contained relaxations required twice as many additional units to be 
committed during the adjustment process (i.e., taking the market solution and modifying 
it to obtain an AC feasible, N-1 solution). Such adjustments are based on ad-hoc operator 
influenced modifications, which are not clearly established or published, leaving more 
ambiguity relative to the overall process, which is not preferred by market participants, 
especially when the results demonstrate that these practices influence market settlements. 
4.7 Conclusions 
This chapter included an overview of existing constraint relaxation practices of 
the ISOs within the United States. SCUC models are formulated with and without relaxa-
tions in order to assess the overall impact on market costs and market settlements as a 
result of constraint relaxations. Results are presented for two test cases: i) an IEEE test 
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case and ii) a large-scale model of the PJM system with actual market data used in this 
study. All market SCUC solutions were then modified to attain an AC feasible and N-1 
reliable solution. The results thus demonstrate whether relaxations within the market en-
gine require additional operator-based costly out-of-market corrections to occur, which 
can substantially impact not only market efficiency but also market settlements.  
It was expected that after applying these corrections, the dispatch schedule, which 
allowed for constraint relaxations, would result in a higher cost schedule because more 
costly out-of-market corrective actions would be anticipated to be necessary. In the RTS-
96 test case, that did not occur and the final feasible dispatch solution whose market solu-
tion contained relaxations had a lower total cost than the final dispatch solution whose 
market solution did not contain relaxations. As for the PJM test case, the dispatch results 
that initially contained constraint relaxations did need more adjustments to attain N-1 re-
liability and, as expected, the total cost solution for the dispatch without relaxations had a 
lower total cost in the end when comparing N-1 reliable dispatch solutions. For the PJM 
results, not only are the final costs higher, but the generation revenue, generation profit, 
and load payment are all lower. Thus, the sacrifice for price control seems to be higher 
overall system costs, lower profits for generators, and lower payments for the load.  
Even though market participants have previously agreed to such practices, one aspect that 
is generally not preferred is the lack of transparency. While the structure of market mod-
els and settlement schemes are widely known, the process operators take to correct solu-
tions produced by the market engine that are not feasible is far less transparent. While 
there is no guarantee, intuitively, the more relaxations that occur, the more corrections are 
expected in this adjustment phase leading to less transparency.  
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5. EFFECT OF RESERVE RELAXATIONS ON N-1 SECUIRTY 
5.1 Introduction 
 Not all operating and reliability criteria can be explicitly modeled in the market 
and will require the proposed day-ahead market model’s solution from the MMS to be 
adjusted, necessitating an additional adjustment or post-processing phase to correct for 
the approximations and inaccuracies inherent in market solutions. For example, the mar-
ket solution must be altered to meet N-1 reliability criteria, a NERC standard [25]-[26] 
stating that the system must be able to withstand the loss of a single bulk element (trans-
mission line or generator). The effect of constraint relaxations on market outcomes [52] 
as well as system security performance [53] due to line and nodal constraint relaxations 
in the market solution has been investigated in previous work. In [54], the effects of pre- 
and post-contingency transmission line relaxations were investigated and reserve deliver-
ability with renewable penetration was examined in [55]. 
ISOs and RTOs differ in their market practices regarding constraint relaxations, 
outlined in Chapter 3. Some utilize a fixed-price penalty price scheme in their market 
models, but others prefer a staircase penalty price function [32]. Also as stated previously 
in Chapter 3.6, NYISO utilizes a staircase function for its reserve requirement penalty 
price scheme. In this chapter, both of these penalty price schemes are tested for constraint 
relaxations that are similar to reserve requirement constraints. Note that reserve require-
ments are proxy constraints used in the market model that attempt to attain an N-1 secure 
solution. However, these constraints are approximations and do not explicitly model N-1 
contingency scenarios and therefore cannot guarantee the N-1 security requirement. This 
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is one reason why constraint relaxations are used in the market model. Enabling con-
straint relaxations is a method of coping with this issue. Furthermore, there is the notion 
that some constraints should be modeled as soft constraints because they are approxima-
tions. For example, the reserve requirement constraint is an approximation and at times 
could lead to model infeasibilities. In this work, the effect that reserve relaxations have 
on market outcomes and potential N-1 violations will be examined. 
5.2 Procedure 
To investigate the potential impact of reserve relaxations on system security and 
market outcomes, the three area RTS-96 test case [48] was modified to include a 10% 
reduction in capacity limits for both normal operations and emergency ratings for all 120 
transmission lines and transformers. In all other respects, the test case utilized the same 
data for all 96 generators located across 73 buses, 51 of which included aggregated load. 
The RTS-96 test case provides an entire year of load data. To choose representa-
tive days, the k-means clustering algorithm in MATLAB [56] was used. This algorithm 
used the season, the total load, the day type, and the hourly change in load to allocate 
each day into four different clusters. With this algorithm, the load data was separated into 
four different clusters and sixteen days were selected from each cluster for a total of 64 
days tested across all four clusters. 
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5.2.1 SCUC without Reserve Relaxations 
A traditional SCUC formulation without relaxations was used for comparison 
with the relaxed cases. The SCUC formulation is given in (5.1)-(5.25). The objective (1) 
minimizes total system cost, including the procurement of operating (contingency) re-
serves. In (5.2)-(5.6), generator operating constraints are represented, including generator 
capacity and ramping constraints. The facet defining constraints [57]-[58] regarding unit 
status, start-up, and shutdown variables are presented in (5.7)-(5.9). As a result, from 
(5.23)-(5.25), only the status variable, 𝑢𝑔𝑡, must be binary while the start-up and shut-
down, 𝑣𝑔𝑡 and 𝑤𝑔𝑡 respectively, can be continuous variables.  
The reserve requirements are represented in (5.10)-(5.17). Taking a more con-
servative approach, the SCUC is required to acquire reserves greater than or equal to 
120% of the single largest generator contingency (5.10) and is a modification of CAISO’s 
rule [22]. However, this modification is less than PJM’s rule of 150% [49]. In addition, 
CAISO’s rule that specifies that the total reserve acquired must be greater than a combi-
nation of load (𝛼) and load met by non-hydro resources (𝛽) is still applied by (5.11). 
CAISO specifies that operating reserves must exceed 5% of the load met by hydro re-
sources and 7% of load met by non-hydro, which translates to 𝛼 = 0.05, 𝛽 = 0.02 in 
(5.11). From (5.12), the total reserve is reflected as spinning and non-spinning reserve 
and from (5.13) the total reserve must obtain at least half from spinning reserve, while 
(5.14)-(5.17) represent the limits for the spinning and non-spinning reserve acquired. 
Finally, the DCOPF formulation is used to represent the network in (5.18)-(5.20). 
Line flow is calculated using a power transfer distribution factor (PTDF) formulation and 
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a net-injection variable, denoted as 𝑃𝑛𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗
, representing the total power flow into or out of a 
bus for a given period 𝑡. Note that in (5.21), line outage distribution factors (LODFs) are 
used to include transmission contingencies in the SCUC formulation [13], [59]. As a re-
sult, the dispatch chosen by the SCUC is N-1 secure for transmission line contingencies. 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒  ∑ ∑ ∑ (𝑐𝑔𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑃𝑔𝑖𝑡)𝑖𝑡𝑔 + ∑ ∑ (𝑐𝑔
𝑁𝐿𝑢𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝑈𝑣𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝐷𝑤𝑔𝑡)𝑡𝑔   
 + ∑ ∑ (0.25𝑐𝑔𝐼
𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑠𝑝 + 0.05𝑐𝑔𝐼
𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑁𝑆)𝑡𝑔  (5.1) 
𝑢𝑔𝑡𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑃𝑔𝑡 ≤ 𝑢𝑔𝑡𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∀𝑔, 𝑖 = 1, 𝑡  (5.2) 
0 ≤ 𝑃𝑔𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑢𝑔𝑡𝑃𝑔𝑖
𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 ∀𝑔, 𝑖, 𝑡 (5.3) 
𝑃𝑔𝑡 = ∑ 𝑃𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖  ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (5.4) 
𝑢𝑔𝑡−1𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅 + 𝑣𝑔𝑡𝑅𝑔
𝑆𝑈 ≥ 𝑃𝑔𝑡 − 𝑃𝑔𝑡−1 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (5.5) 
𝑢𝑔𝑡𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅 + 𝑤𝑔𝑡𝑅𝑔
𝑆𝐷 ≥ 𝑃𝑔𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑔𝑡 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (5.6) 
𝑣𝑔𝑡 − 𝑤𝑔𝑡 = 𝑢𝑔𝑡 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡−1 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (5.7) 
∑ 𝑣𝑔𝑠+𝑇
𝑡
𝑠=𝑡−𝑈𝑇𝑔+1 + ∑ 𝑣𝑔𝑠
𝑡
𝑠=𝑡−𝑈𝑇𝑔+1 ≤ 𝑢𝑔𝑡 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (5.8) 
∑ 𝑤𝑔𝑠+𝑇
𝑡
𝑠=𝑡−𝐷𝑇𝑔+1 + ∑ 𝑤𝑔𝑠
𝑡
𝑠=𝑡−𝑈𝑇𝑔+1 ≤ 1 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (5.9) 
1.2𝑃𝑔𝑡 + 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑆𝑃 ≤ 𝑟𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑞
 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (5.10) 
𝑟𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑞 ≥ 𝛼 ∑ 𝑃𝑔𝑡𝑔 + 𝛽 ∑ 𝑃𝑔𝑡𝑔𝜖𝐻(𝑔)=0  ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (5.11) 
𝑟𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑞 ≤ ∑ (𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑆𝑃 + 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑁𝑆)𝑔  ∀𝑡 (5.12) 
0.5𝑟𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑞 ≤ ∑ 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑆𝑃
𝑔  ∀𝑡 (5.13) 
0 ≤ 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑆𝑃 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑃𝑔𝑡 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (5.14) 
𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑆𝑃 ≤ 𝑅𝑔
10𝑢𝑔𝑡 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (5.15) 
0 ≤ 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑁𝑆 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥(1 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡) ∀𝐹𝑆𝑔 = 1, 𝑔, 𝑡 (5.16) 
  64 
𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑁𝑆 ≤ 𝑅𝑔
10(1 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡) ∀𝐹𝑆𝑔 = 1, 𝑔, 𝑡 (5.17) 
−𝑃𝑛𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗 + ∑ 𝑃𝑔𝑡𝑔∈𝑔(𝑛) = 𝑑𝑛𝑡 ∀𝑛, 𝑡 (5.18) 
−𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≤ ∑ 𝑃𝑛𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛𝑘
𝑅𝐸𝐹
𝑛 ≤ 𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∀𝑘, 𝑡 (5.19) 
∑ 𝑃𝑛𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑛 = 0 ∀𝑡 (5.20) 
−𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝐶 ≤ ∑ 𝑃𝑛𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛𝑘
𝑅𝐸𝐹
𝑛 + 𝐿𝑂𝐷𝐹𝑘𝑧 ∑ 𝑃𝑛𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛𝑧
𝑅𝐸𝐹
𝑛 ≤ 𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝐶
  
 ∀𝑘, 𝑧, 𝑡 (5.21) 
0 ≤ 𝑣𝑔𝑡 ≤ 1 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (5.22) 
0 ≤ 𝑤𝑔𝑡 ≤ 1 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (5.23) 
𝑢𝑔𝑡𝜖{0,1} ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (5.24) 
5.2.2 SCUC Reformulation to Include Reserve Relaxations 
 Two different reserve relaxation schemes, a fixed-price scheme and staircase 
curve price scheme are examined. Similar to [60], spinning reserve was assumed to be 
25% of the last operating cost segment and non-spinning reserve was assumed to be 5% 
of the last operating cost segment, such that the non-spinning price would be less than the 
spinning reserve price. As a result, the highest price for spinning reserve was approxi-
mately 25 $/MW, while non-spinning reserve was only offered at approximately 10 
$/MW. Including reserve relaxations in the SCUC means that the objective (5.1), reserve 
requirement for total reserves (5.12) and the reserve requirement that requires half come 
from spinning reserve (5.13) must be modified. 
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For fixed-price relaxations, the following modifications needed for (5.1) and 
(5.12)-( 5.13) are shown in (5.25)-( 5.28). The prices for relaxing spinning and non-
spinning reserves are listed in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 below. 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒  ∑ ∑ ∑ (𝑐𝑔𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑃𝑔𝑖𝑡)𝑖𝑡𝑔 + ∑ ∑ (𝑐𝑔
𝑁𝐿𝑢𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝑈𝑣𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝐷𝑤𝑔𝑡)𝑡𝑔   
 + ∑ ∑ (0.25𝑐𝑔𝐼
𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑠𝑝 + 0.05𝑐𝑔𝐼
𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑁𝑆)𝑡𝑔 + ∑ (𝑐
𝑆𝑃𝑠𝑡
𝑆𝑃 + 𝑐𝑁𝑆𝑠𝑡
𝑁𝑆)𝑡  (5.25) 
𝑟𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑞 ≤ ∑ (𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑆𝑃 + 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑁𝑆)𝑔 + 𝑠𝑡
𝑆𝑃 + 𝑠𝑡
𝑁𝑆 ∀𝑡 (5.26) 
0.5𝑟𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑞 ≤ ∑ 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑆𝑃 + 𝑠𝑡
𝑆𝑃
𝑔  ∀𝑡 (5.27) 
𝑠𝑡
𝑆𝑃, 𝑠𝑡
𝑁𝑆 ≥ 0 ∀𝑡 (5.28) 
For staircase curve price relaxations, the following modifications needed for (5.1) 
and (5.12)-( 5.13) are shown in (5.29)-(5.34). The index 𝑥 represents the number of steps, 
which is assumed to be three, and the price for each step monotonically increases from 
the previous step. The prices for relaxing spinning and non-spinning reserves are listed in 
Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 below. Note that for the staircase relaxation scheme, a fourth it-
eration was solved, but the solution did not produce any relaxations and therefore its re-
sults were not reported. 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒  ∑ ∑ ∑ (𝑐𝑔𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑃𝑔𝑖𝑡)𝑖𝑡𝑔 + ∑ ∑ (𝑐𝑔
𝑁𝐿𝑢𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝑈𝑣𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝐷𝑤𝑔𝑡)𝑡𝑔   
 + ∑ ∑ (0.25𝑐𝑔𝐼
𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑠𝑝 + 0.05𝑐𝑔𝐼
𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑁𝑆)𝑡𝑔 + ∑ ∑ (𝑐𝑞
𝑆𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑥
𝑆𝑃 + 𝑐𝑞
𝑁𝑆𝑠𝑡𝑥
𝑁𝑆)𝑥𝑡  (5.29) 
𝑟𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑞 ≤ ∑ (𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑆𝑃 + 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑁𝑆)𝑔 + ∑ (𝑠𝑡𝑥
𝑆𝑃 + 𝑠𝑡𝑥
𝑁𝑆)𝑥  ∀𝑡 (5.30) 
0.5𝑟𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑞 ≤ ∑ 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑆𝑃 + ∑ 𝑠𝑡𝑥
𝑆𝑃
𝑥𝑔  ∀𝑡 (5.31) 
0 ≤ 𝑠𝑡𝑥
𝑆𝑃, 𝑠𝑡𝑥
𝑁𝑆 ≤ 2 ∀𝑥 = 1, 𝑡 (5.32) 
0 ≤ 𝑠𝑡𝑥
𝑆𝑃, 𝑠𝑡𝑥
𝑁𝑆 ≤ 5 ∀𝑥 = 2, 𝑡 (5.33) 
𝑠𝑡𝑋
𝑆𝑃, 𝑠𝑡𝑋
𝑁𝑆 ≥ 0 ∀𝑡 (5.34) 
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Table 5.1. Spinning Reserve Relaxation Prices. 
Scheme Type Price 1 Price 2 Price 3 Price 4 
Fixed 50 $/MWh 100 $/MWh 200 $/MWh 400 
$/MWh 
Staircase-
price 
Set 1 (2 MW  
allowed) 
50 $/MWh 100 $/MWh 200 $/MWh N/A 
Set 2 (5 MW  
allowed) 
100 $/MWh 200 $/MWh 400 $/MWh N/A 
Set 3  
(unlimited) 
500 $/MWh 1000 $/MWh 2000 $/MWh N/A 
 
Table 5.2. Non-Spinning Reserve Relaxation Prices. 
Scheme Type Price 1 Price 2 Price 3 Price 4 
Fixed-price 40 $/MWh 80 $/MWh 200 $/MWh 400 $/MWh 
Staircase-
price 
Set 1 (2 MW  
allowed) 
40 $/MWh 80 $/MWh 160 $/MWh N/A 
Set 2 (5 MW  
allowed) 
80 $/MWh 160 $/MWh 320 $/MWh N/A 
Set 3  
(unlimited) 
400 $/MWh 800 $/MWh 1600 $/MWh N/A 
 
5.3 Contingency Analysis with Acquired Reserves 
As part of testing the potential impacts of reserve relaxations, the non-relaxed 
SCUC, fixed-priced relaxed SCUC, and the staircase relaxed SCUC solutions were tested 
for N-1 violations with a contingency analysis tool (5.35)-(5.42) that only allows acquired 
reserve from the market solution to alleviate the N-1 contingency. This model allows for 
infinite transmission capability by including the slack variables 𝑠𝑘𝑡
+  and 𝑠𝑘𝑡
− . However, if 
either of these variables is greater than zero, the dispatch is not N-1 secure. Note the 
model presented is for generator contingencies and can be easily modified for non-radial 
transmission line contingencies. However, with the LODFs formulation in the SCUC, 
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non-radial transmission contingencies have already been taken into account, i.e. the event 
and the recourse action are taken into account in the market solution. 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∑ ∑ 𝑠𝑘𝑡
+ + 𝑠𝑘𝑡
−
𝑡𝑘  (5.35) 
𝑁1𝑔?̅?𝑔𝑡(?̅?𝑔𝑡 − 𝑅𝑔𝑡
𝑆𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) ≤ ?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≤ 𝑁1𝑔?̅?𝑔𝑡(?̅?𝑔𝑡 + 𝑅𝑔𝑡
𝑆𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (5.36) 
𝑁1𝑔𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑖𝑛?̅?𝑔𝑡 ≤ ?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≤ 𝑁1𝑔𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥?̅?𝑔𝑡 ∀𝑔, 𝑡, 𝐹𝑆𝑔 = 0 (5.37) 
0 ≤ ?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≤ 𝑁1𝑔𝑅𝑔𝑡
𝑁𝑆 ∀𝑔, 𝑡, 𝐹𝑆𝑔 = 1 (5.38) 
−𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝐶 − 𝑠𝑘𝑡
− ≤ 𝑃𝑘𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝐶 + 𝑠𝑘𝑡
+  ∀𝑘, 𝑡 (5.39) 
𝑃𝑘𝑡 − 𝐵𝑘(𝜃𝑛𝑡 − 𝜃𝑚𝑡) = 0 ∀𝑡 (5.40) 
∑ 𝑃𝑘𝑡∀∈𝛿+(𝑛) − ∑ 𝑃𝑘𝑡∀∈𝛿−(𝑛) + ∑ 𝑃𝑔𝑡𝑔∈𝑔(𝑛) = 𝑑𝑛𝑡 ∀𝑛, 𝑡 (5.41) 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
+ , 𝑠𝑘𝑡
− ≥ 0 ∀𝑘, 𝑡 (5.42) 
5.4 Benders’ Decomposition 
After evaluating the market solutions based on N-1 violations (5.35)-(5.42), both 
relaxed and non-relaxed market solutions are corrected for N-1 violations using a Bend-
ers’ decomposition algorithm similar to [24] and [61], except non-spinning reserve was 
allowed to participate in mitigating N-1 violations. The original dispatch solutions (re-
laxed and non-relaxed) were all corrected such that no post-contingency violations oc-
curred. After obtaining the N-1 secure solutions, market outcomes were compared. Final-
ly, it should be noted that these N-1 secure solutions will no longer contain any reserve 
relaxations. 
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5.5 Results 
The modified RTS-96 test case [48] was solved by using the model presented 
above without relaxations (non-relaxed), fixed-priced relaxations (fixed-price), and stair-
case-priced relaxations (staircase). Furthermore, fixed-priced and staircase-priced relaxa-
tions cases were solved multiple times with increasing penalty prices, which are given in 
Table 5.1 and Table 5.2. In all three cases, the reserve rule, (5.10), captured the same 
amount of total operating reserves (approximately 701GW) summed over all study days, 
including spinning and non-spinning reserves. With the fixed-price and staircase relaxa-
tions, not all of total reserve was truly acquired because the market solution instead chose 
to acquire an artificial reserve product through the slack variables. Although the reserve 
required was approximately the same, the amount acquired from the market was less. Re-
sults regarding the number of relaxations for both cases (fixed-price and staircase), total 
system cost from the initial market solutions, N-1 security violations, and market out-
comes corrected of the N-1 secure solutions obtained from utilizing the Benders’ decom-
position algorithm were compared. All mipgaps for the market SCUC with and without 
relaxations as well as the Benders’ decomposition were set to 0.5%. 
The amount of reserve relaxed for each price iteration is given in Table 5.3. From 
these results, it can be seen that the fixed-price relaxation penalty scheme has more relax-
ations because the slack variable allows for any amount of reserve to be relaxed at a sin-
gle set price. On the other hand, the staircase relaxation scheme has less relaxations over-
all because the first two stairs of relaxations are constrained to be at most 2 and 5 MWh, 
respectively, and the final stair allows for any amount. As a result, the staircase market 
solution only exhibits relaxations for the first three sets of prices, as seen in Table 5.1 and 
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Table 5.2. Of the 64 days tested, not all days exhibited relaxations. For the fixed-price 
penalty scheme, the number days with relaxations was 28, 17, 13, and 8 with respect to 
the increasing price sets given in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2. Additionally, for the staircase-
price penalty scheme, the days with relaxations were 17, 11, and 10 with respect to the 
increasing price sets as shown in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2. 
Both relaxed solutions (fixed-price and staircase-price) have lower total system 
costs compared to the non-relaxed solution, which is expected because a SCUC that al-
lows for relaxations has a greater feasible space and, therefore, is able to find a less costly 
market solution. In Table 5.4 below, the total system cost summed over days with reserve 
relaxations and the number of days with relaxations of the relaxed (fixed-price and stair-
case-price) market solutions for each price iteration is shown. Since not all days in the 
data set had relaxations for the fixed-price and staircase-priced market solutions, only 
days with relaxations were compared. Furthermore, as the penalty price increased, the 
number of days with reserve relaxations decreased. For comparison, the non-relaxed 
market solution is summed separately over the same days of each relaxed solution, which 
is why there are two entries for the non-relaxed solution. From Table 5.4, it can be seen 
that the market solution for the non-relaxed case always has a slightly higher cost than 
both relaxed cases, which is expected because both fixed-priced and staircase market so-
lutions that were relaxed should be no worse off than the non-relaxed solution. 
When testing these solutions for N-1 violations using (5.36)-(5.43), only the oper-
ating reserve acquired was allowed to participate in attempting to mitigate the potential 
violations from the N-1 contingency. In Table 5.5 below, the N-1 violations for hours 
with relaxations are reported for the fixed-priced and staircase-priced relaxed market so-
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lutions for hours with relaxations. The N-1 violations are compared to the non-relaxed 
case for the same hours. As the price increases, the relaxed solutions will have less relax-
ations and thus fewer hours are compared when testing for N-1 violations. Also, from Ta-
ble 5.5, it can be seen that these relaxed solutions still have a greater number of potential 
N-1 violations than the non-relaxed case. Nevertheless, all initial market solutions, in-
cluding the non-relaxed market solution, must be corrected such that the dispatch solu-
tions are N-1 secure. 
Table 5.3. Reserve Relaxations Distinguished by Penalty Scheme and Reserve Type 
(MW). 
Case Reserve Type Price 1 Price 2 Price 3 Price 4 
Fixed-price Spin 6034 104 28 0 
Non-spin 7820 877 244 78 
Staircase-price Spin 100 38 30 None 
Non-spin 131 66 58 None 
 
Table 5.4. Total System Cost Summed Over Days with Relaxations ($k) for Initial Mar-
ket Solutions for Relaxed and Non-Relaxed Cases and Time Period with Relaxations for 
Relaxed Cases (days). 
Case Price 1 Price 2 Price 3 Price 4 
Total System Cost for Days with Relaxations 
Fixed-price 47,832 27,761 21,782 13,291 
Non-relaxed (compare w/ fixed) 48,024 27,777 21,791 13,292 
Staircase-price 34,263 17,684 17,716 N/A 
Non-relaxed (compare w/ staircase) 34,321 17,710 17,729 N/A 
Number of Days Relaxed 
Fixed-price 28 17 13 8 
Staircase 17 11 10 None 
 
While the total system costs are similar, the non-relaxed solution exhibits consid-
erably less N-1 security violations than the fixed-priced and staircase-priced relaxed solu-
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tions for days with reserve relaxations because the non-relaxed solution has acquired 
more reserves, whereas both relaxed solutions have acquired artificial resources through 
the slack variables and, thus, cannot dispatch as much reserve. Even with a small differ-
ence in total system cost, the dispatch solutions are quite different in their level of N-1 
security, i.e., the non-relaxed case is always more secure than the relaxed cases because 
for hours with relaxations, the relaxed cases have less reserve to deliver. 
Table 5.5. Total N-1 Violations for hours with Relaxations (MW). 
Case Price 1 Price 2 Price 3 Price 4 
Fixed-price 24218 3233 2410 828 
Non-relaxed (same hours as fixed) 4111 2999 2381 722 
Staircase-price 2700 2218 906 N/A 
Non-relaxed (same hours as staircase) 2478 2204 859 N/A 
 
After utilizing Benders’ decomposition algorithm to correct the market solutions, 
N-1 secure solutions for all cases (fixed-price relaxed, staircase relaxed, and non-relaxed) 
were obtained. Table 5.6 has the total system cost after utilizing Benders’ algorithm to 
achieve an N-1 secure solution. Only days that have relaxations were included. As before, 
the non-relaxed case is compared separately over the same days for each relaxed case. 
There are two entries because days with relaxations for the fixed-priced solution are not 
always the same as those as the staircase-priced solution.  
The difference between the total system cost from the market solutions (Table 
5.4) to the N-1 secure solutions (Table 5.6) range from 1.75% to 3.34%. The change for 
the fixed-price solution going from market to N-1 secure was the greatest for the highest 
penalty prices at 3.34% and the lowest for the third penalty price set at 2.27%. Compar-
ing the non-relaxed solution for the same days as the fixed-price relaxed solutions, the 
  72 
greatest change was at 2.75% for the same days of the fourth price set and 1.75% for the 
first price set days. For the staircase relaxed solution, the greatest change in total system 
cost from the initial market solution to the N-1 secure solution was for the second price 
set and the least was for the first price set. Comparing the same days of the non-relaxed 
case, the greatest change in total system cost was for the same days of the second price 
set and the least was with the first price set. 
Table 5.6. N-1 Secure Solutions’ Total System Costs Summed Over Days with Relaxa-
tions in ($k) and Time Period (days). 
Case Price 1 Price 2 Price 3 Price 4 
Total System Cost Summed over Study Period 
Fixed-price 49,041 28,529 22,277 13,735 
Non-relaxed (compare w/ fixed) 48,864 28,348 22,232 13,657 
Staircase-price 35,045 18,182 18,150 N/A 
Non-relaxed (compare w/ staircase) 34,928 18,071 18,084 N/A 
Number of Study Period (Previously Relaxed) 
Fixed-price 28 17 13 8 
Staircase 17 11 10 None 
 
When comparing the N-1 secure solutions, the non-relaxed solution for the same 
days is on whole cheaper than both of the previously relaxed cases that are now also N-1 
secure. This is a result of the initial market solutions of both the previously relaxed cases 
needing more corrections to get to the N-1 secure solution and conversely, the fewer 
changes needed for the non-relaxed solution. Small differences in the initial market solu-
tions lead to significant differences in the final outcomes, which can be seen in the differ-
ences in total cost for N-1 secure solutions in Table 5.6. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
 In this chapter, the effect of reserve relaxations on system N-1 security was inves-
tigated based on the static reserve rules utilized in the SCUC models employed by ISOs 
and RTOs today. Reserve requirements in the SCUC are proxy requirements and attempt 
to ensure N-1 security, but do not guarantee it.  
Reserve requirements are proxy requirements that attempt to meet N-1 security. 
Reserve relaxations allowed in the market SCUC mean that less reserve has been pro-
cured because an artificial resource was acquired instead. Therefore, market solutions 
with reserve relaxations can have N-1 violations not only due to a lack of reserves, but 
also the approximate nature of the reserve requirement, which is one main reason for in-
cluding the practice of constraint relaxation in the market because at times these approx-
imate requirements can cause model infeasibilities if strictly enforced. Some market op-
erators hold the opinion that some constraints should be soft constraints instead of hard 
constraints (strictly enforced). 
The SCUC market solution is the starting point for Benders’ algorithm, which is 
used to arrive at N-1 security for all solutions. As a result, the relaxed versus non-relaxed 
cases will have similar solutions, but the relaxed cases are always higher because of the 
need for more corrections. Therefore, a difference in the number of N-1 violations for 
both relaxed and non-relaxed cases still exists. 
When testing for N-1 violations, the relaxed solutions had more violations than 
the non-relaxed solutions, which had a greater amount of reserves than relaxed solutions. 
It should be noted that the non-relaxed solution must also be corrected because of N-1 
violations. In the end, the non-relaxed N-1 secure solution is cheaper than the N-1 secure 
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solutions that were previously relaxed because the relaxed solutions had more violations 
to correct. However, this difference is not markedly significant, which reinforces one of 
the main motivations behind including constraint relaxations in market models, e.g., that 
strictly enforcing approximate constraints such as reserve requirements that cannot guar-
antee N-1 reliability is counterproductive. One may reason that these types of approxi-
mate constraints should instead be modeled as soft constraints. Note that due to the relax-
ations, the relaxed cases will typically need more corrections and more adjustments to 
arrive at the N-1 secure solution for relaxed cases than non-relaxed cases. Nevertheless, 
the non-relaxed case must be adjusted as well. Retaining the present configuration of the 
market models means that current relaxation practices are justifiable, which is especially 
true for reserve requirements. Since a post-processing phase must still be performed, be-
ing overly strict with the reserve requirement is not justifiable. Thus, allowing the reserve 
requirement constraint to sometimes be relaxed for a worthy reason such as price control 
is a rational and judicious use of resources. 
  
  75 
6. OUT-OF-MARKET CORRECTIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
 The day-ahead scheduling process is generally very complex. In the USA, ISOs 
start by solving a SCUC market model. The day-ahead scheduling procedure can involve 
a variety of additional steps as well, including a RUC model [11], a scheduling run and a 
pricing run [9], as well other stages that adjust the market solution in order to get the final 
day-ahead schedule. These additional changes that happen outside the market model are 
referred to as out-of-market corrections (OMCs). There are additional industry terms used 
to refer to specific actions taken by the operator; such terms vary and include uneconomic 
adjustments [1], manual dispatches [12], security corrections [13], exceptional dispatches 
[14], and out of merit energy/capacity [20]. While this work focuses on market environ-
ments, the actual practice of implementing such adjustments is used by any operator that 
solves a SCUC with approximations.  
Currently, such market models are deterministic, i.e., they are not stochastic pro-
grams. Even with a push towards stochastic programming, [17], day-ahead market mod-
els will continue to have approximations due to the complexity of managing such an in-
tricate engineered system. Furthermore, there is the ongoing debate as to how much com-
plexity is desired within market models [18]. Such debates weigh transparency, which is 
valued by market participants, against the efficiency of the proposed market solution as 
well as the accuracy of the market prices. As such, even with advances in algorithmic 
performance, hardware, and parallel computing, market models will continue to include 
such approximations, resulting in continued use of OMC procedures.   
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OMCs are needed due to a variety of approximations. For instance, nomograms 
(hyperplanes) are commonly used to ensure simultaneous operating limits are maintained. 
Inaccurate nomograms will require the solution to be corrected by the operator. Proxy 
line flow constraints may also be generated to ensure system stability, e.g., lines may be 
stability constrained instead of thermally constrained. Ideally, unit commitment would 
properly account for an ACOPF, optimize across all resources including generation and 
their non-convexities (e.g., ramp rates that are dependent on the dispatch level), transmis-
sion (e.g., transformer tap settings, flexible ac transmission systems devices, phase shift-
ers, transmission switching), flexible demand, storage, and include critical uncertainties 
(intermittent renewables, demand, contingencies). Instead, unit commitment is currently a 
deterministic mixed integer linear program. 
One main setback is the cost of the OMC actions. The CAISO and ERCOT spent 
roughly $80 million in 2006 on OMCs [62]-[63]. In [1]-[4] and [9], CAISO, SPP, and 
ERCOT outline their market structures and procedures for day-ahead and real-time mar-
ket settlements. In [1] and [9], CAISO states that they resort to OMC procedures in order 
to get feasible solutions when market based bids are insufficient. CAISO states their ob-
jective is to achieve outcomes consistent with good operational practices, which support 
reliable operations and prevent “unreasonable” price outcomes. The OMC procedures for 
SPP and ERCOT are stated in [2] and [3], respectively. The primary explanation given 
for the need for OMCs for these regional transmission organizations is that economic 
bids alone are insufficient to provide a proper solution. While this explanation is given to 
market participants, the true cause is market model approximations.  
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This work extends [35] to further examine the implications of OMCs. First, com-
mon approximations used within dispatch models and the reason these approximations 
are necessary are described. In Section 6.2, detailed examples of industry practices are 
provided for these practices that have yet to be fully analyzed in terms of their potential 
implications associated with market efficiency, market settlements, market bidding be-
havior, as well as the impact on both the day-ahead and real-time markets. Section 6.3 is 
a discussion and replication of a typical day-ahead scheduling process. Section 6.4 pre-
sents three algorithms, each of which modifies the market solution in order to obtain an 
N-1 reliable solution; one is designed to replicate an existing industry practice. While the 
presented algorithms are not guaranteed to work for every test case, they were effective 
for the test case studied. With these algorithms, an attempt is made to inform market 
stakeholders about OMCs in the day-ahead process and their implications on settlements. 
Section 6.5 provides results for the OMC algorithms and compares them to stochastic 
unit commitment results. Section 6.6 concludes this chapter. 
6.2 Industry Practices 
6.2.1 AC Feasibility 
OMCs are almost always required. Existing SCUC market models incorporate a 
linear approximation of the AC optimal power flow (ACOPF), which leads to the most 
common need for an OMC to obtain an AC feasible solution. For instance, if there is in-
adequate reactive power supply in an area, an additional generator may be turned on. If 
there is a line overload, the operator may examine the power transfer distribution factors 
(PTDFs) associated to that line and then choose a set of generators to be re-dispatched. 
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These two actions would be classified as out-of-merit capacity and out-of-merit energy 
by ERCOT [20]. This commonly adopted process of using PTDFs to identify sets of gen-
erators to be re-dispatched is replicated in Section 6.4 by what is referred to as the PTDF 
heuristic. 
6.2.2 Representation of the Network Model 
 OMCs may also be needed because market models approximate the network 
model, i.e., only select transmission lines are monitored. The ISO-NE solves SCUC 
without a full DCOPF formulation. ISO-NE uses approximate interface limits to estimate 
transfer capabilities on key paths and later performs a check on the base case power flow 
and selects post-contingency cases, i.e., they conduct contingency analysis. Violations are 
reported by contingency analysis and, time permitting, the operator may rerun the market 
SCUC with added constraints to correct violations. While this process can be repeated 
until an optimal N-1 solution is determined, the computational complexities inhibit solv-
ing such a procedure. Therefore, the market operator resorts to an OMC procedure to ob-
tain a valid solution. 
6.2.3 Reserve Requirements 
OMCs may also be needed because proxy reserve requirement policies do not 
guarantee N-1 reliability. Even when the quantity of available reserve exceeds the largest 
contingency, it must be deliverable in the post-contingency state without causing post-
contingency voltage violations or transmission overloads. The only way to obtain the op-
timal N-1 UC solution is to explicitly represent the post-contingency states. When such 
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recourse states are represented, the problem becomes a two-state stochastic program with 
recourse, which is extremely difficult to solve with existing technology. Many ISOs to-
day incorporate reserve zones, which are regional reserve policies that are meant to en-
sure that reserves are dispersed across the system [55], [64]. While such policies improve 
the procurement of reserve, OMCs may still be required. Generators that are unable to 
deliver their reserves may be disqualified by the operator who then chooses other units to 
provide the needed reserve. This process is referred to as reserve disqualification and re-
serve downflags at MISO and ISO-NE, respectively [55]. Since operator discretion and 
knowledge dictate the solution quality, these procedures can be costly. These procedures 
also bias locational marginal prices (LMPs). 
6.2.4 CAISO’s Integrated Forward Market 
CAISO’s day-ahead market, otherwise known as the Integrated Forward Market 
(IFM), is separated into two stages. The first stage, i.e., the “scheduling run,” determines 
the generator dispatches, which CAISO calls awards. Subsequently, CAISO performs a 
“pricing run” with the results from the scheduling run; in the pricing run, only small epsi-
lons away from the dispatches from the scheduling run are allowed. LMPs are then de-
termined from the pricing run. 
In both stages, CAISO implements constraint relaxation procedures by allowing 
constraints to be violated for a set penalty, i.e., price, which is the same as placing a limit 
on the shadow price (dual variable) of the constraint. For example, in CAISO’s schedul-
ing run, a line’s power flow may exceed its maximum thermal limit for a penalty price of 
$5,000/MWh [9]. In the scheduling run, penalty prices are set much higher than in the 
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pricing run because CAISO seeks to find dispatch solutions with limited relaxations (vio-
lations). In the pricing run, settlements are determined and, thus, the penalty prices are 
much lower in order to limit excessively high prices for the resulting market solution [9]. 
Other ISOs also implement similar constraint relaxation practices [65]. The proposed 
market solution with constraint relaxations may not meet required operating standards 
and, therefore, may require OMC actions.  
CAISO also implements a RUC after performing its scheduling and pricing runs 
in the IFM; the RUC ensures sufficient capacity is committed at the day-ahead time 
stage. The RUC procures additional capacity when the load serving entities (LSEs) pur-
chase demand in the IFM that is less than CAISO’s own demand forecast. Furthermore, 
CAISO removes all offers by virtual bidders in the RUC since their supply or demand is 
artificial and their bids are only meant to obtain market convergence. The RUC process 
can be seen as a formal and optimized OMC procedure. Just as OMC actions affect the 
market solutions in both the day-ahead and real-time stages, RUC procedures also affect 
market outcomes [30]. By having the RUC separate from the IFM, inefficiencies and 
price distortions occur. Recently, CAISO has considered merging their RUC with their 
IFM, [31]. 
6.3 Problem Formulation 
The approach starts by solving a day-ahead SCUC and subsequently testing for 
reliability by performing N-1 contingency analysis in order to satisfy NERC standards. 
When contingency analysis finds a violation, the market-based SCUC solution is not reli-
able and OMC actions are needed to obtain a reliable solution; note that decomposition 
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techniques for stochastic programs could be used, but in this work the focus is on the role 
of OMC actions to obtain N-1 reliable solutions. After an OMC action is identified, a re-
dispatch model (a SCED) is solved as a part of the overall OMC procedure. The new 
schedule is again checked for N-1 feasibility and, if it is not reliable, the process repeats. 
This day-ahead scheduling procedure with OMCs can be viewed in Figure 6.1. For this 
work, it is assumed that the SCUC model is solved at most once. There are additional 
variations as to how market operators may handle these situations, e.g., some of these vi-
olations may be handled by re-solving SCUC, in a RUC, or in the real-time market in-
stead. For instance, many MMS contain a sub-routine to check the SCUC solution against 
a limited number of contingencies [16]; this creates an iterative process by which the 
SCUC solution becomes more reliable. While such sub-routines exist, based on time limi-
tations and the limited number of contingencies that are monitored within the MMS, the 
market SCUC solution is still not guaranteed to be reliable. Note that there are LMPs re-
ported at different stages in Figure 6.1 that are used in the results section to analyze the 
impact of OMCs. 
Contingency 
Analysis
Report Dispatch Schedule
(OMC LMPs)
Out of Market 
Correction
Re-dispatch
  Units 
Fail?
Pass?
SCUC
(SCUC LMPs)
 
Figure 6.1. Day-Ahead Scheduling Process with OMCs. 
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6.3.1 Day-Ahead Security Constrained Unit Commitment 
The day-ahead SCUC market model is a traditional multi-period unit commitment 
model with a DCOPF formulation, similar to [35]. This SCUC model, (6.1)-(6.20), ac-
counts for spinning and non-spinning reserve requirements, which is similar to that in 
[22]. 
Min: ∑ ∑ 𝑐𝑔𝑃𝑔𝑡𝑔 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑁𝐿𝑢𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝑈𝑣𝑔𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝐷𝑤𝑔𝑡 (6.1) 
𝑃𝑔𝑡 ≥ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑔𝑡 ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.2) 
𝑃𝑔𝑡 + 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑠 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑢𝑔𝑡 ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.3) 
∑ 𝑣𝑔𝑠
𝑡
𝑠=𝑡−𝑈𝑇𝑔−1 ≤ 𝑢𝑔𝑡 ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.4) 
∑ 𝑤𝑔𝑠
𝑡
𝑠=𝑡−𝐷𝑇𝑔−1 ≤ 1 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡 ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.5) 
𝑣𝑔𝑡 − 𝑤𝑔𝑡 = 𝑢𝑔𝑡 − 𝑢𝑔,𝑡−1 ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.6) 
𝑃𝑘𝑡 − 𝐵𝑘(𝜃𝑛𝑡 − 𝜃𝑚𝑡) = 0 ∀ 𝑘, 𝑡 (6.7) 
−𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≤ 𝑃𝑘𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∀ 𝑘, 𝑡 (6.8) 
∑ 𝑃𝑘𝑡𝑘∈𝛿+(𝑛) − ∑ 𝑃𝑘𝑡𝑘∈𝛿−(𝑛)  + ∑ 𝑃𝑔𝑔∈𝑔(𝑛) = 𝑑𝑛𝑡 ∀ 𝑛, 𝑡 (6.9) 
𝑃𝑔𝑡 − 𝑃𝑔,𝑡−1 ≤ 𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅𝑢𝑔,𝑡−1 + 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑣𝑔𝑡 ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.10) 
𝑃𝑔,𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑔𝑡 ≤ 𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅𝑢𝑔𝑡 + 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑤𝑔𝑡 ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.11) 
𝑟𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥  ≤ ∑ (𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑠 + 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑛𝑠)𝑔  ∀ 𝑡 (6.12) 
𝑟𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥  ≥ ∑ 0.07𝑑𝑛𝑛  ∀ 𝑡 (6.13) 
𝑟𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥  ≥ 𝑃𝑔𝑡 + 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑠  ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.14) 
𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑠  ≥ 0.5𝑟𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.15) 
𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑛𝑠  ≥ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑖𝑛(1 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡)𝐹𝑆𝑔 ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.16) 
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𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑛𝑠  ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥(1 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡)𝐹𝑆𝑔 ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.17) 
𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑛𝑠  ≤ 𝑅𝑔
10(1 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡)𝐹𝑆𝑔 ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.18) 
𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑠 ≤ 𝑅𝑔
10𝑢𝑔𝑡 ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.19) 
𝑢𝑔𝑡 ∈ {0,1}; 0 ≤ 𝑣𝑔𝑡, 𝑤𝑔𝑡 ≤ 1 ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.20) 
6.3.2 Contingency Analysis 
The day-ahead SCUC results are fed into an N-1 contingency analysis tool, which, 
for this investigation, is a steady-state, linearized OPF tool (note that the functional form 
of contingency analysis varies based on the application). The transmission emergency 
limits are assumed to be 125% of their long-term rated values. This tool allows the 
transmission limits to be violated, which is accomplished by adding slack variables to the 
transmission line limits. The objective is to minimize violations across all transmission 
lines, similar to (17)-(25) in [35], except that fast-start units are allowed to provide non-
spinning reserve. This contingency analysis tool, for a single generator contingency, is 
shown by (6.21)-(6.28) and can be easily modified to represent a transmission contingen-
cy. The decision variables in (6.21)-(6.28) represent the post-contingency actions that 
would be taken. 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∑ 𝑠𝑘
+ + 𝑠𝑘
− 𝑘  (6.21) 
?̅?𝑔𝑁1𝑔(?̅?𝑔 − 𝑅𝑔
10) ≤ ?̂?𝑔 ≤ ?̅?𝑔𝑁1𝑔(?̅?𝑔 + 𝑅𝑔
10) ∀ 𝑔 (6.22) 
𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑖𝑛?̅?𝑔𝑁1𝑔 ≤ ?̂?𝑔 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥?̅?𝑔𝑁1𝑔 ∀ 𝑔, 𝐹𝑆𝑔 = 0 (6.23) 
0 ≤ ?̂?𝑔 ≤ (1 − ?̅?𝑔)𝑁1𝑔𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∀𝑔, 𝐹𝑆𝑔 = 1 (6.24) 
𝑃𝑘 − 𝐵𝑘(𝜃𝑛 − 𝜃𝑚) = 0 ∀ 𝑘 (6.25) 
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−𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑐 − 𝑠𝑘
− ≤ 𝑃𝑘 ≤ 𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑐 + 𝑠𝑘
+ ∀𝑘 (6.26) 
∑ 𝑃𝑘𝑘∈𝛿+(𝑛) − ∑ 𝑃𝑘𝑘∈𝛿−(𝑛) + ∑ ?̂?𝑔𝑔∈𝑔(𝑛) = 𝑑𝑛 ∀𝑛 (6.27) 
𝑠𝑘
+ ≥ 0 , 𝑠𝑘
− ≥ 0 ∀𝑘 (6.28) 
6.4 Out-of-Market Correction Procedures 
Starting with the reported violations from contingency analysis, two different 
OMC procedures were tested. The process employed by both procedures is detailed in 
Figure 6.2. One procedure was utilized for both ranking algorithms, the PTDF heuristic 
(PTDF) and greedy algorithm (Greedy), whereas the second augmented procedure was 
only used with the Greedy algorithm (Greedy-A). The second procedure was tested with 
the PTDF heuristic, but the process did not produce a feasible solution. The ranking algo-
rithms are performed in Step 2, shown in Figure 6.2. Both procedures modify the dis-
patch schedule until an N-1 reliable solution is obtained by taking two possible corrective 
actions: either the desired dispatch point (DDP) [66], of previously committed units, is 
modified or additional units are committed. The difference between OMC procedures 1 
and 2 is based on the implementation of Steps 3 and 4. 
6.4.1 OMC procedure 1 
The first procedure implemented for both PTDF and Greedy begins by ranking 
units based on those that would have the greatest impact on the current largest contingen-
cy over all time periods (Step 1 in Figure 6.2). The OMC action ranked highest (Step 2 in 
Figure 6.2) for the largest recorded contingency is performed (Step 3 in Figure 6.2). 
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If the OMC action (Step 3 in Figure 6.2) is to turn on an additional unit, then that 
unit is turned on during time periods of reported violations for the given contingency as 
well as for other periods to satisfy operational constraints, such as minimum up and down 
time requirements. The new unit commitment schedule is then re-dispatched to find the 
new DDP of all committed units to ensure a feasible dispatch. 
If the OMC action (Step 3 in Figure 6.2) is to modify the DDP of a previously 
committed unit, the new DDP is found by solving a modified contingency analysis mod-
el, similar to (6.21)-(6.28) for time periods that have reported violations for the current 
largest contingency. For the unit that will have its DDP modified by the OMC action, the 
reserve ramp rate restrictions are ignored and the unit is allowed to be re-dispatched any-
where between its minimum and maximum capacities. The supply level reported, during 
the periods of violations for the unit, is taken as the new DDP. It should be noted that any 
unit that has its DDP changed by a prior OMC action is still eligible for its DDP to be 
redefined in a subsequent correction phase of a later OMC action.  
After every OMC action, a new minimum cost solution is determined (Step 4 in 
Figure 6.2). Units that were chosen by the OMC ranking procedure to have their DDP 
changed are then restricted by this re-dispatch (SCED) model to be within their 10-
minute ramp capability of the required post-contingency dispatch levels determined by 
the OMC procedure in order to ensure violations are alleviated. Units that were chosen by 
the market and not chosen as an OMC action are allowed to be re-dispatched in this mod-
el subject to hourly ramp rates; they are not restricted to match their initial DDP from the 
market solution. This process is taken to replicate the changes to the dispatch schedule 
that would happen in real-time due to the implemented OMC actions. Once the system is 
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re-dispatched after the OMC action, contingency analysis is performed again and the pro-
cess repeats until all violations are alleviated. 
 
Figure 6.2. Detailed Process Employed by Both OMC Procedures. 
6.4.2 OMC procedure 2 
Another augmented procedure was used with the greedy algorithm (Greedy-A) 
only. The initial steps (Step 1 and Step 2 in Figure 6.2) are the same as OMC procedure 
1. In Step 3, there is no difference between the two procedures when additional units are 
committed. The main difference was how the OMC action handled units that had their 
DDP modified (Step 3 and Step 4 in Figure 6.2). If the greedy algorithm determined that 
the most beneficial action was to modify the DDP of a specific unit, the new DDP was 
similarly determined as before; however, once the new DDP is chosen to alleviate the 
violation, it is not allowed to be changed, i.e., the new DDP for the modified units was 
held constant for all subsequent OMC actions (Step 3 in Figure 6.2) and re-dispatch mod-
els (Step 4 in Figure 6.2). The DDP was only allowed to move within its 10-minute ramp 
rate within contingency analysis. This process was repeated until a reliable solution was 
obtained. 
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6.4.3 Ranking with the PTDF Heuristic 
One industry practice is to define an OMC action by examining the PTDFs for 
transmission lines that have overloads reported by contingency analysis. The proposed 
PTDF heuristic mimics this process. Generators located at buses that have large PTDFs 
associated with that line are positioned higher in the rank list. The specific goal is to de-
termine which generators to turn on or modify their DDP if already committed to reduce 
the flow on the overloaded line as much as possible.  
For situations where a contingency causes multiple lines to be overloaded, genera-
tors are ranked by accounting for their ability to reduce the flows on all of the overloaded 
lines. To determine this ranking, (6.29)-(6.31) are used where (6.30) is the value of turn-
ing on an additional unit and (6.31) is the value of modifying the DDP of a unit. These 
values are compared and the OMC action with the highest value is implemented. 
For overloaded transmission lines, generator bus locations are ranked based on the 
sum of the PTDF values, multiplied by a parameter 𝛽𝑘𝑡
𝑐 . When the desire is to have nega-
tive PTDFs, 𝛽𝑘𝑡
𝑐  is set to -1. When the desire is to have positive PTDFs, 𝛽𝑘𝑡
𝑐  is set to 1. 
Note that 𝛽𝑘𝑡
𝑐  is set to 0 for lines that are not overloaded. With this heuristic, the desire is 
to have negative PTDFs when the flow exceeds its maximum limit and the desire is to 
have positive PTDFs when the flow exceeds its minimum limit. Once these 𝛼𝑛(𝑔)𝑡
𝑐  values 
are determined, the generators are ranked from most likely to reduce the post-
contingency overload to least likely. The ranking is established by (6.30) and (6.31). The 
values of 𝛼𝑛(𝑔)𝑡
𝑐  are added up across all periods with violations for generator g, which is 
located at node n, for the periods that it is off. This value is then normalized by the num-
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ber of periods it is offline. This produces 𝛾𝑐𝑔
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠, which reflects the cumulative 𝛼𝑛(𝑔)𝑡
𝑐  
value for each generator averaged by the number of periods the unit is offline. Likewise 
for 𝛾𝑐𝑔
𝐷𝐷𝑃, which reflects changing the DDP of a unit, the absolute value of 𝛼𝑛(𝑔)𝑡
𝑐  is used 
because the DDP can be moved up or down depending on whether additional (or less) 
supply would create a counter-flow and thus decrease the flow across an overloaded line. 
𝛾𝑐𝑔
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 and 𝛾𝑐𝑔
𝐷𝐷𝑃 are then used to create the ranking list and the highest ranked action is 
the implemented OMC action. 
𝛼𝑛(𝑔)𝑡
𝑐 = ∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑛
𝑅𝐸𝐹𝛽𝑘𝑡
𝑐
𝑘  ∀𝑛, 𝑡, 𝑐 (6.29) 
𝛾𝑐𝑔
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 =
∑ 𝛼𝑛(𝑔),𝑡
𝑐 (1−𝑢𝑔𝑡)𝑡
∑ (1−?̅?𝑔𝑡)𝑡
 ∀𝑔, 𝑐 (6.30) 
𝛾𝑐𝑔
𝐷𝐷𝑃 =
∑ |𝛼𝑛(𝑔),𝑡
𝑐 𝑢𝑔𝑡|𝑡
∑ 𝑢𝑔𝑡𝑡
 ∀𝑔, 𝑐 (6.31) 
6.4.4 Ranking with the Greedy Algorithm 
The greedy algorithm seeks to estimate the most beneficial change that can be 
made to the market solution in order to obtain a reliable solution. It is based on a sensitiv-
ity study, i.e., shadow prices are used to create a priority list of OMC actions. Shadow 
prices (dual variables), are used to rank the potential OMC actions based on changing the 
DDP or committing an additional unit and are captured in the following mathematical 
program (6.32)-(6.48). Equation (6.46) enforces the commitment decisions determined by 
the market model. The dual variable, 𝜆𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠, specifies the marginal impact on the objec-
tive if the right hand side of (6.46) is increased; for units that are offline (?̅?𝑔𝑡 = 0), the 
desire is for this dual variable to be a large negative value. Similarly, the dual variable of 
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(6.47), 𝜆𝐷𝐷𝑃, captures the marginal value of changing a generator from its DDP. It is also 
preferable to have 𝜆𝐷𝐷𝑃 be a large negative value as well. 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∑ 𝑠𝑘𝑡
+ + 𝑠𝑘𝑡
−
𝑘  (6.32) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≤ 𝑁1𝑔?̅?𝑔𝑡+1(?̅?𝑔𝑡+1 + 𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅)𝛿𝑔𝑡 + 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥(1 − ?̅?𝑔𝑡+1)𝑁1𝑔𝛿𝑔𝑡  
 +𝑁1𝑔(?̅?𝑔𝑡 + 𝑅𝑔
10)(1 − 𝛿𝑔𝑡) ∀?̅?𝑔𝑡 = 1, 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.33) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≤ 𝑁1𝑔?̅?𝑔𝑡−1(?̅?𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅)𝛿𝑔𝑡 + 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥(1 − ?̅?𝑔𝑡−1)𝑁1𝑔𝛿𝑔𝑡  
 +𝑁1𝑔(?̅?𝑔𝑡 + 𝑅𝑔
10)(1 − 𝛿𝑔𝑡) ∀?̅?𝑔𝑡 = 1, 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.34) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≥ (𝑁1𝑔?̅?𝑔𝑡+1(?̅?𝑔𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅)) 𝛿𝑔𝑡  
 +𝑁1𝑔(?̅?𝑔𝑡 − 𝑅𝑔
10)(1 − 𝛿𝑔𝑡) ∀?̅?𝑔𝑡 = 1, 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.35) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≥ (𝑁1𝑔?̅?𝑔𝑡−1(?̅?𝑔𝑡−1 − 𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅)) 𝛿𝑔𝑡  
 +𝑁1𝑔(?̅?𝑔𝑡 − 𝑅𝑔
10)(1 − 𝛿𝑔𝑡) ∀?̅?𝑔𝑡 = 1, 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.36) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≤ ?̂?𝑔𝑡𝑁1𝑔?̅?𝑔𝑡+1(?̅?𝑔𝑡+1 + 𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅) + 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥?̂?𝑔𝑡𝑁1𝑔(1 − ?̅?𝑔𝑡+1) ∀?̅?𝑔𝑡 = 0, 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.37) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≤ ?̂?𝑔𝑡𝑁1𝑔?̅?𝑔𝑡−1(?̅?𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅) + 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥?̂?𝑔𝑡𝑁1𝑔(1 − ?̅?𝑔𝑡−1) ∀?̅?𝑔𝑡 = 0, 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.38) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≥ ?̂?𝑔𝑡𝑁1𝑔?̅?𝑔𝑡+1(?̅?𝑔𝑡+1 + 𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅) ∀?̅?𝑔𝑡 = 0, 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.39) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≥ ?̂?𝑔𝑡𝑁1𝑔?̅?𝑔𝑡+1(?̅?𝑔𝑡+1 + 𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅) ∀?̅?𝑔𝑡 = 0, 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.40) 
𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑖𝑛?̂?𝑔𝑡𝑁1𝑔 ≤ ?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥?̂?𝑔𝑡𝑁1𝑔 ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.41) 
𝑃𝑘𝑡 − 𝐵𝑘(𝜃𝑛 − 𝜃𝑚) = 0 ∀ 𝑘, 𝑡 (6.42) 
−𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑐 − 𝑠𝑘𝑡
− ≤ 𝑃𝑘𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑐 + 𝑠𝑘𝑡
+  ∀ 𝑘, 𝑡 (6.43) 
∑ 𝑃𝑘𝑡𝑘∈𝛿+(𝑛) − ∑ 𝑃𝑘𝑡𝑘∈𝛿−(𝑛) + ∑ ?̂?𝑔𝑡𝑔∈𝑔(𝑛) = 𝑑𝑛𝑡 ∀ 𝑛, 𝑡 (6.44) 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
+ , 𝑠𝑘𝑡
− ≥ 0 ∀ 𝑘, 𝑡 (6.45) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 = ?̅?𝑔𝑡𝑁1𝑔 [𝜆𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠] ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.46) 
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𝛿𝑔𝑡 = 0 [𝜆𝐷𝐷𝑃] ∀?̅?𝑔𝑡 = 1, 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.47) 
𝛿𝑔𝑡 = 1 ∀?̅?𝑔𝑡 = 0, 𝑔, 𝑡 (6.48) 
After obtaining the dual variables associated with (6.46) and (6.47), rank lists are 
created for each contingency with a violation using (6.49) and (6.50). Offline units are 
ranked based on the dual variable, 𝜆𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠; (6.49) is used to estimate the average effec-
tiveness of turning the unit on for the hours it is off and for the hours that have violations. 
For the OMC actions associated with modifying DDPs, which estimates the average ef-
fectiveness of changing the DDP across all hours the unit is committed and for the hours 
that have violations, (6.50) is used. Both actions, represented by 𝜌𝑐𝑔
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 and 𝜌𝑐𝑔
𝐷𝐷𝑃, are 
ranked and the highest ranked action is implemented. 
𝜌𝑐𝑔
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 =
∑ 𝜆𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠(1−?̅?𝑔𝑡)𝑡  
∑ (1−𝑢𝑔𝑡)𝑡
 ∀𝑐, 𝑔 (6.49) 
𝜌𝑐𝑔
𝐷𝐷𝑃 =
∑ 𝜆𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑢𝑔𝑡𝑡  
∑ 𝑢𝑔𝑡𝑡
 ∀𝑐, 𝑔 (6.50) 
6.5 Results and Analysis 
The IEEE-118 test case, [67], was solved by SCUC, which did not produce an N-
1 reliable solution and was modified by the different OMC procedures (PTDF, Greedy, 
and Greedy-A). An extensive-form security-constrained stochastic unit commitment 
(ESCUC) model (a two-stage stochastic program) was solved. It provides the optimal so-
lution to the N-1 UC problem since all contingencies are explicitly represented. This 
model is similar to [24], but transmission switching is not included.  The optimal OMC 
action is also solved for, which is accomplished by taking the resulting market based 
SCUC solution and then feeding that solution into an extensive form stochastic program 
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for SCUC as well. This solution is represented by the ESCUC-UC result, which is based 
on the ESCUC model except that the ESCUC model is modified to take in the resulting 
market SCUC solution and not allow for any units committed by the market to be de-
committed. That is, the ESCUC-UC determines the optimal N-1 reliable solution while 
requiring all units committed by the market stay committed, which provides a lower 
bound on all OMC actions. Settlements for the different OMC solutions (PTDF, Greedy, 
Greedy-A, and ESCUC-UC) were calculated using the market SCUC solution’s LMPs, as 
well as the respective resulting OMC solution’s LMPs; these two variants can be inter-
preted as two policy decisions: to either use LMPs that result from the market model 
(SCUC) or LMPs that result from the OMC actions. With the four potential OMC solu-
tions (PTDF, Greedy, Greedy-A, and ESCUC-UC, the last representing the optimal OMC 
action) represented twice for the two different potential settlements rule along with the 
original market solution (SCUC) and the optimal N-1 SCUC solution (ESCUC), a sto-
chastic program, ten different solutions are compared. These settlements are displayed in 
Table 6.1, and Table 6.2, and Figure 6.3. 
If the settlements in the day-ahead market are based on SCUC LMPs, which is the 
current practice, and not the resulting LMPs after implementing OMCs, there may be a 
discrepancy between the day-ahead prices and the real-time market, which can be seen by 
the results in Figure 6.3, Table 6.1, and Table 6.2. While the posted day-ahead prices are 
based on the day-ahead market solution only, the actual day-ahead schedule includes the 
OMCs, which will be reflected in the real-time market and, hence, affect real-time LMPs. 
Even if limited or no trading occurs in real-time, the real-time LMPs would not be the 
same as the day-ahead LMPs simply due to the result of the OMCs. Such market proce-
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dures may cause a market separation between the day-ahead and real-time markets, 
which could be exploited by market participants and virtual bidders. Such modifications 
to the market solution could be seen as being the same or similar to the way in which 
self-schedules or bilateral contracts can affect the markets. However, in this case, it is the 
market operator who is implementing such changes as well as relying on established set-
tlement policies that are used to compensate the units involved with the OMC actions. 
For both the Greedy and the PTDF solutions, the total system settlements were 
higher using the original SCUC LMPs. Settlements increased, including the total system 
cost, generator revenue, and load payment. On the other hand, the Greedy and PTDF so-
lutions exhibit lower generator profits. 
Table 6.1. Market Settlements for Extensive-form SCUC and SCUC ($k for Test Day). 
 ESCUC SCUC 
Total cost 1,268 1,228 
Gen. revenue 3,336 1,897 
Gen. profit 2,068 668 
Uplift payment 374 138 
Load payment 3,884 2,023 
Congestion rent 548 126 
 
When using LMPs obtained after the OMC actions, settlements are drastically dif-
ferent. For the Greedy solution, the settlements were higher than the SCUC. The PTDF 
settlements were typically lower, which is caused by the high number of OMC actions 
that were implemented. The PTDF heuristic ended up modifying the solution in such a 
way that the LMPs fell and, thus, the settlements were much lower. However, even if 
PTDF heuristic settlements were performed using its LMPs, the generators are still prof-
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itable due to uplift payments. These settlement results can be viewed in Figure 6.3, Table 
6.1, and Table 6.2. The change in the commitment schedules can be viewed in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.2. Total Costs and Market Settlements of OMCs ($k for Test Day). 
 ESCUC-UC Greedy-A Greedy PTDF 
Total cost 1,291 1,338 1,390 1,373 
Settlements using LMPs from original SCUC solution 
Gen. revenue 1,897 1,900 1,915 1,908 
Gen. profit 606 562 525 534 
Uplift payment 198 244 282 272 
Load payment 2,023 2,023 2,023 2,023 
Congestion rent 126 123 108 115 
Settlements using LMPs from OMC solution 
Gen. revenue 1,983 1,957 2,234 1,246 
Gen. profit 692 618 844 (127) 
Uplift payment 186 258 359 504 
Load payment 2,217 2,070 2,326 1,421 
Congestion rent 234 114 91 175 
 
Greedy-A settlements were not that different whether using the SCUC LMPs or 
its resulting LMPs, as seen in Figure 6.3, Table 6.1, and Table 6.2. The procedure used 
for Greedy-A made the least amount of changes to the original SCUC schedule, even 
compared to the ESCUC-UC solution (see Table 6.3). The Greedy-A procedure also per-
forms better than the procedure used for Greedy and PTDF when comparing total cost to 
the system. 
The ESCUC-UC solution, which used the market SCUC solution as a basis, ob-
tained the optimal N-1 reliable OMC solution when starting from the proposed market 
solution (with the exception of the optimality gap). This problem explicitly models all 
contingencies but it does not allow any unit that is committed by the market to be de-
committed. System settlements were calculated using the SCUC LMPs and its own re-
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sulting LMPs. Typically, the settlements were higher when using the LMPs from the 
ESCUC-UC solution, which could be seen in Figure 6.3, Table 6.1, and Table 6.2.  
ESCUC achieved the lowest cost solution because it simultaneously optimizes the 
first-stage decisions while considering the second-stage (post-contingency) corrections 
needed to ensure N-1. The settlement results for the ESCUC are drastically different 
compared to the other solutions. It has the highest load payment, generator revenue, profit 
with uplift, and congestion rent. Such results are caused by LMPs being systematically 
higher. The ESCUC reflects the cost of acquiring additional capacity while guaranteeing 
N-1 feasibility whereas existing SCUC models that use proxy reserve requirements do not 
(the ESCUC is a two-stage stochastic program whereas the SCUC is a deterministic op-
timization problem). While such proxy reserve requirements may provide a reliable solu-
tion, the dual variables that are used to determine LMPs are not capable of capturing the 
value of delivering the next MWh during the post-contingency states since such recourse 
states are not explicitly represented. While such a result cannot be guaranteed, the results 
match what is expected: that the dual variables are lower since they are incapable of re-
flecting the value of delivering that next MW during the potential post-contingency 
states. 
The missing money debate, which argues that generators are not receiving suffi-
cient compensation, is frequently discussed with regard to market designs. Such an argu-
ment has been used to partially justify the creation of capacity markets. In this report, the 
results demonstrate that if there truly is a missing money problem, it may be the result of 
proxy constraints that are used within market models.  
  95 
The results show that there is a substantial difference between the market settle-
ments (and prices), between the optimal N-1 SCUC solution (ESCUC), and the resulting 
solutions when using a deterministic SCUC followed by OMCs. LMPs, which are based 
on deterministic market SCUC models that do not explicitly represent each post-
contingency state, do not capture the value of delivering the next MW during that post-
contingency state. Even if generators are strategically bidding, taking into account a risk 
premium when determining their reserve bid, this bidding strategy would be different for 
the case when the auction (the market SCUC) is deterministic versus stochastic (i.e., 
when it would include an explicit representation of contingencies). The deterministic 
model has a mathematical representation of reserve requirements (e.g., zonal reserve 
rules) that has limited ability to distinguish the value of the reserve of one generator from 
another (when they are within the same zone); on the other hand, a stochastic program is 
capable of identifying and differentiating between reserves based on locations since the 
contingencies are explicitly modeled. It is thus left to future work to investigate how 
prices and settlements could change if market models represented reliability requirements 
more accurately. 
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Figure 6.3. System Settlements for the Different Unit Commitment Solutions and with 
Different Settlement Policies by Using SCUC LMPs Versus OMC LMPs. 
Solving the extensive form model without using the day-ahead SCUC solution re-
sults in the N-1 reliable ESCUC solution, which simultaneously optimizes first-stage dis-
patch decisions as well as accounts for second-stage post-contingency states to guarantee 
N-1 reliability. The result is a lowest cost N-1 reliable solution for the test case. System 
settlements differ significantly compared to the other dispatch solutions, a result of LMPs 
being higher overall. These higher LMPs, which reflect acquiring additional MWh at a 
certain location during a certain hour, also account for post-contingency states since the 
ESCUC solution accounts for all contingencies. For example, in this test case, a contin-
gency on the second generator causes major N-1 violations. The ESCUC model accounts 
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for this contingency in any given hour. However, the LMPs at the bus increase tremen-
dously, which for a few hours is over $1000, and thus the average over the entire time 
period is higher than the other dispatch solutions. This result can be viewed in Figure 6.4. 
Similar results occur at major loaded buses. 
Table 6.3. Dispatch Difference Between SCUC, Greedy, PTDF, Greedy-A, and  
ESCUC-UC. 
Gen 
Time – Hour 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1
0 
1
1 
1
2 
1
3 
1
4 
1
5 
1
6 
1
7 
1
8 
1
9 
2
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2 
2
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1          
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◊
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◊
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■ 
◊
○
■ 
◊
○
■ 
   
3        □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □      
6          ■ ■ ■ ■            
8         ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■         
10                 ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
12 □ □ □ □ □ □                   
33 
◊
○ 
◊
○ 
◊
○ 
◊
○ 
◊
○ 
◊
○ 
◊
○ 
                 
34 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ◊○                 
41 
◊
○
■ 
◊
○
■ 
◊
○
■ 
◊
○
■ 
◊
○
■ 
◊
○
■ 
◊
○
■ 
                 
42 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
■
□ 
          
■
□ 
□    
43 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □            
■
□ 
□    
44 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
■
□ 
          
■
□ 
□    
45 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □            
■
□ 
□    
46                  □ □      
49       
■
□ 
◊○
■□ 
                
52 
■
□ 
■
□ 
■
□ 
■
□ 
■
□ 
■
□ 
■
□ 
■□ 
■
□ 
■
□ 
■
□ 
■
□ 
■
□ 
■
□ 
■
□ 
■
□ 
■
□ 
       
53 □                        
54 
◊
○
■ 
◊
○
■ 
◊
○
■ 
◊
○
■ 
◊
○
■ 
◊
○
■ 
◊
○
■ 
◊○
■ 
                
Original SCUC  Greedy-A ◊ Greedy ○ PTDF ■ ESCUC-UC □ 
 
  98 
 
Figure 6.4. LMPs Averaged Over All Hours at Major Generator Buses. 
6.6 Conclusions 
Market solutions might not be feasible since the solution may not be AC feasible 
or the acquired reserves might not be deliverable. Such approximations require the mar-
ket operator to implement OMCs. At times, such corrections can be handled by the real-
time market; however, that can only happen if the operator is confident that there will be 
sufficient capacity. This chapter presented different OMC procedures (PTDF, Greedy, 
and Greedy-A) that could be used to achieve N-1 feasibility and discusses the corre-
sponding market implications.  
In practice, operators implement a variety of OMC actions. For example, in the 
day-ahead process, ISOs solve a RUC, which ensures sufficient capacity. The RUC is a 
formalized OMC procedure because it also modifies the market solution. For OMC pro-
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cedures that are not as formalized (e.g., an operator decision to turn on additional genera-
tors to provide reactive power support), such procedures may be at the discretion of the 
operator. Such actions that happen outside the market may be hard to predict. On the con-
trary, since the OMC actions may be based on the operator’s prior knowledge, similar 
OMC actions may frequently be chosen, which could be interpreted as a bias towards se-
lect market participants.  
The results have shown that such OMC actions strongly influence commitment 
schedules and settlements. The results from the extensive form stochastic unit commit-
ment model also show that the market prices from deterministic SCUC models do not 
capture the full value of reliability. When contingencies are explicitly represented in the 
optimization problem, this creates a two-stage stochastic program; the corresponding dual 
variables are then able to capture the costs of delivering that marginal MWh from both 
the normal operating state and the post-contingency states. Thus, the market implications 
associated with using a simplified, deterministic market model were demonstrated. 
ISOs generally set market prices based on the market solution, not the resulting 
day-ahead schedule. This creates a natural separation between the forward (day-ahead) 
market and the spot (real-time) market. At this stage, it is unclear whether these proce-
dures enable market exploitation opportunities.  
Approximations will always exist for electric energy markets due to the complexi-
ty of such a complex engineered system. This work identifies the importance of these ap-
proximations with regard to their effect on market operations and settlements. Such find-
ings add to the debate regarding desired market complexity as well as whether OMC ac-
tions should be more formalized.  
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7. CONCULSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
7.1 Conclusions 
The MMS used by ISOs and RTOs are mixed integer linear programs that solve 
unit commitment and dispatch problems. Even though the software and algorithmic per-
formance have been improved, market models cannot fully capture all the complexities 
inherent in operating a complex power system. For example, various approximations 
within market models include a linear DCOPF rather than the more accurate ACOPF, lin-
ear ramping constraints, and proxy reserve requirements instead of explicitly modeling all 
contingencies. Additional complexities result from load uncertainty and, more recently, 
variable generation. Due to the approximations and inaccuracies that are characteristic of 
electric energy market models, at times the market itself leads to infeasible solutions. To 
guarantee feasibility, ISOs and RTOs allow select constraints to be violated or relaxed in 
their market models, a practice known as constraint relaxation. To incorporate a con-
straint relaxation within a market model, the ISO or RTO adds a slack variable to a con-
straint in the market model. The slack variable is then added to the objective function 
multiplied by a pre-determined penalty price. 
In the day-ahead market model, the practices of constraint relaxations and out-of-
market corrections (OMCs) were analyzed. To initiate the study of these practices, a de-
terministic SCUC model that accounted for generator operating constraints, reserve re-
quirements, and a transmission network through a linearized DCOPF formulation was 
solved. The initial solutions from the deterministic SCUC were then modified to meet 
criteria known as AC and N-1 feasibility. Market outcomes were then analyzed based on 
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this process, which was detailed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. These criteria were met 
based upon operator initiated actions, referred to as OMCs. Various OMC algorithms 
were utilized to demonstrate the practices’ effect on market outcomes as well. These 
OMC algorithms were also compared to an ideal solution from a stochastic program to 
assess how well they performed based on market outcomes and the results were given in 
Chapter 6. 
A review of the use of constraint relaxation practices by various ISOs and RTOs 
was conducted. Subsequently, a proposed model with key constraint relaxations was pre-
sented. The model was solved with and without relaxations utilizing a standard IEEE test 
case and a 15,000 bus test case based on proprietary PJM data. Both proposed market so-
lutions were adjusted to attain AC and N-1 feasibility. All solutions were compared with 
regard to their market outcomes. Market solutions with constraint relaxations typically 
needed more out-of-market corrections to reach an AC and N-1 feasible solution. How-
ever, this was not always the case, which was demonstrated by one of the test cases used. 
Since penalty prices can greatly affect the frequency of constraint relaxations, a 
penalty price analysis has been included in this work.  Generally, constraint relaxation 
practices and penalty prices are negotiated with market participants. Originally, constraint 
relaxation practices utilized only a single fixed-price penalty scheme, but today some 
ISOs and RTOs have adopted staircase penalty price curves. These two different penalty 
price schemes were tested with reserve requirement constraints, which are proxy re-
quirements that attempt but do not guarantee N-1 feasibility. In all cases tested, the mar-
ket solutions with reserve relaxations (fixed-price and staircase) had more N-1 security 
violations. Nevertheless, the non-relaxed solution had violations as well. Thus, all solu-
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tions needed corrections. The relaxed solutions typically needed more corrections, which 
resulted in higher costs. Again, these penalty prices and schemes must be negotiated with 
market participants, while the process that modifies the market solution to the feasible 
operating solution must meet all system requirements, such as N-1 feasibility. 
The inclusion of constraint relaxations within market models is a necessary prac-
tice for ISOs and RTOs. The industry has yet to fully understand how these practices af-
fect market participants, therefore, the work presented investigates the impact of these 
constraint relaxation practices and demonstrates the possible effects by using a realistic 
test case that an ISO might have to solve. During this investigation, it was found that the 
policies of ISOs and RTOs are not readily transparent and it is recommended that they 
establish more candid policies regarding their constraint relaxation practices, along with 
steps taken to remove violations from market solutions. Additionally, it was found that 
the different schemes for assessing penalty prices employed by ISOs and RTOs today can 
influence the frequency of relaxations, which has been clearly demonstrated with reserve 
relaxations. Moreover, relaxing the proxy reserve requirement constraint may affect N-1 
security since solutions with more relaxations will typically have more N-1 violations and 
thus need more corrections to attain a feasible N-1 secure solution. However, ISOs and 
RTOs are still justified in utilizing constraint relaxations in their market models to deal 
with these approximations that could cause infeasibilities and for price control. 
OMCs (the industry has several proprietary terms for this practice) are used by all 
system operators including ISOs, RTOs, and vertically integrated utilities. OMCs modify 
the dispatch solution away from the market solution reported by the SCUC when eco-
nomic bids are insufficient and produce an invalid solution that occurs due to inaccurate 
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assumptions and approximations in the SCUC. Even with advances in the performance of 
unit commitment formulations, these still require approximations to simplify the market 
and thus operators still need to adjust proposed solutions to guarantee a feasible solution 
that meets operating requirements. To demonstrate the implications these OMCs have on 
energy markets, a SCUC was solved and the market solution was then tested for N-1 reli-
ability, which was not achieved because the contingency analysis tool reported line viola-
tions. To relieve these violations, different OMC procedures were implemented, but not 
all were successful. The market results were displayed for the different OMC procedures 
and compared using LMPs reported by the SCUC and LMPs reported by the resulting 
unit commitment dispatch solution after OMCs were implemented. These dispatch solu-
tions were also compared to the market results of the ESCUC, the stochastic program 
whose formulation is presented in Chapter 2.6, which simultaneously solved for second 
stage post-contingency states while optimizing first stage unit commitment decisions, and 
ESCUC-UC, which utilized the least costly N-1 reliable solution found when starting 
with the market solution from the SCUC. All of these results demonstrate that any modi-
fication to the market solution from the SCUC modifies the settlements and due to ISOs 
typically reporting prices (LMPs) based on the SCUC forward and real-time markets, will 
have a natural separation in prices that could be exploited by some participants in the 
market. Furthermore, the lack of explicitly modelling a requirement in the market, such 
as N-1 reliability, means that the cost to attain the requirement is not truly priced into the 
market and must at times be handled outside the market with an out-of-market correction, 
which again is the cause of the price separation. Therefore, ISOs and RTOs must detail 
their practices not only by solving their market, but also by the process of achieving the 
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final feasible operating state. This work demonstrates the effects of these practices on 
market participants. Although ISOs and RTOS recognized that market practices such as 
constraint relaxations were probably affecting market outcomes, the possible effects had 
not been investigated and hence this work is the first attempt to document the influence 
of constraint relaxations and out-of-market corrections. 
Finally, since market models cannot capture all uncertainties nor guarantee relia-
bility and also contain various approximations that preclude a comprehensive representa-
tion of all operations, the use of constraint relaxations in market models is reasonable and 
justified. This practice, as well as the adjustment process, e.g. the use of out-of-market 
corrections to arrive at a feasible operating state, while justified, should be made as trans-
parent as possible to market participants. 
7.2 Future Work 
The work presented in this thesis demonstrated the effects of constraint relaxation 
practices if relaxations are allowed in the market, but removed in the adjustment phase on 
constraints such as node balance, thermal line limits, and reserve relaxations from a for-
ward market optimization model. Investigations into how constraint relaxations affect 
real-time operations have yet to be completed. The first issue to investigate is the effect 
of the duration of a constraint relaxation that appears in real-time operations – especially 
for line limit relaxations. The EMS of market operators will identify actual real-time re-
laxations. At this point the operator has authority to take immediate action or to have the 
real-time SCED handle this relaxation in the next round. However, according to industry 
advisors, there is no guarantee that the relaxation will be removed by the SCED and in-
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stead the relaxation could remain. The task is to develop a heuristic method to determine 
penalty prices for real-time operations to update and prevent relaxations that last for long 
durations, i.e. as the duration of the relaxation increases then the associated penalty prices 
for that constraint increases as well. 
Another task related to OMCs is the algorithms developed were did not account 
for AC feasibility. This task would involve improving the algorithms detailed in this the-
sis such that the algorithms modify the initial proposed forward market solution from the 
SCUC until an AC and N-1 feasible solution is obtained. As a result, the market proce-
dures to adjust the proposed market solution to meet these criteria can become seamless 
in a single process. 
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CONSTRAINT RELAXATION MODEL AMPL MODEL AND RUN FILES 
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Model File: 
#===========================================================================
======= 
# Yousef Al-Abdullah 
# M-29 -- Constraint Relaxation Project 
# RTS-96 Test Case - data resolved with Ahmed Salloum 
#===========================================================================
======= 
 
#===========================================================================
======= 
# Sets 
#===========================================================================
======= 
set GEN; 
set BRANCH; 
set BUS; 
set TIME; 
set SEG:= 1..4; 
#===========================================================================
======= 
 
#===========================================================================
======= 
# Parameters - Common Parameters 
#===========================================================================
======= 
# Generator Parameters (use g for Generator data) 
param gen_bus  {g in GEN};  # generator bus location 
param min_UT  {g in GEN};  # minimum up time 
param min_DT  {g in GEN};  # minimum down time 
param gen_limit1  {g in GEN}; 
param gen_limit2  {g in GEN}; 
param gen_limit3  {g in GEN}; 
param gen_limit4  {g in GEN}; 
param gen_min  {g in GEN};  # generator minimum supply 
param gen_max  {g in GEN};  # generator maximum supply 
param Cost_SU  {g in GEN};  # generator startup cost 
param Cost_SD  {g in GEN};  # generator shutdown cost 
param Cost_NL  {g in GEN};  # generator no-load cost 
param Cost_OP1  {g in GEN};  # generator operating cost 
param Cost_OP2  {g in GEN};  # generator operating cost 
param Cost_OP3  {g in GEN};  # generator operating cost 
param Cost_OP4  {g in GEN};  # generator operating cost 
param RampHR  {g in GEN};  # Hourly ramp rate 
param Ramp10  {g in GEN};  # 10 min ramp rate 
param FS   {g in GEN};  # Fast start generator unit indicator (1) for 
true (0) otherwise 
param HYD   {g in GEN};  # Hydro generator unit indicator (1) for true 
(0) otherwise 
 
# generator paramter to save total supply output 
param vCost  {g in GEN, j in SEG}; 
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param gLimit {g in GEN, j in SEG}; 
 
# Branch Parameters (use k for Branch data) 
param fbus  {k in BRANCH}; # branch from bus 
param tbus  {k in BRANCH}; # branch to bus 
param Bk  {k in BRANCH}; # branch susceptance 
param CAPA  {k in BRANCH}; # branch thermal limit 
param CAPE  {k in BRANCH}; # branch emergency limit 
 
# BUS & Time Parameters (use i for Node data) 
param maxLOAD {i in BUS};  # load/demand at each bus during each period 
param LoadPrcnt {t in TIME};   # percentage of load each time period 
param Load  {i in BUS, t in TIME}; # Load by bus and time 
param NumPeriods; 
let NumPeriods := 24; 
 
# ptdf 
param PTDF  {i in BUS, k in BRANCH, x in 0..120}; 
 
# Penalty Factor Parameters 
param PF_line; 
let PF_line := 100; 
 
# Settlement Parameters 
param LMP  {i in BUS, t in TIME}; 
param gen_revenue {g in GEN, t in TIME}; 
param gen_cost  {g in GEN, t in TIME}; 
param gen_profit  {g in GEN, t in TIME}; 
param generator_revenue_all_periods {g in GEN}; 
param generator_profit_all_periods  {g in GEN}; 
param generator_cost__all_periods  {g in GEN}; 
param opportunity_cost   {g in GEN, t in TIME}; 
param current_profit   {g in GEN, t in TIME}; 
param diff_btwn_OpportunityCost_Profit {g in GEN, t in TIME}; 
param generator_difference_btwn_OpportunityCost_Profit {g in GEN}; 
param total_for_generator {g in GEN}; 
param take_maximum {g in GEN}; 
param Uplift_payment {g in GEN}; 
#===========================================================================
======= 
 
#===========================================================================
======= 
# Variables 
#===========================================================================
======= 
var StatusG {g in GEN, t in TIME} binary; # generator status 
var Power_SG {g in GEN, t in TIME, j in SEG};   # generator supply 
var Supply_T {g in GEN, t in TIME};   # total generator supply 
var SpinRsv {g in GEN, t in TIME};   # spinning reserve 
var NonSpin {g in GEN, t in TIME};   # non-spinning reserve 
var TotlRsv {t in TIME} >=0;    # total time period reserve 
var StartUp {g in GEN, t in TIME} >= 0; # startup genertor 
var ShutDwn {g in GEN, t in TIME} >= 0; # shutdown generator 
var PowrInj {i in BUS, t in TIME};   # power injection for ptdf method 
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var slack_Lpos {k in BRANCH, t in TIME} >= 0;  # used for constraint relaxation to 
INCREASE the amount of LINE FLOW in the positive direction 
var slack_Lneg {k in BRANCH, t in TIME} >= 0;  # used for constraint relaxation to 
INCREASE the amount of LINE FLOW in the negative direction 
#===========================================================================
======= 
 
#===========================================================================
======= 
# Objective Functions 
#===========================================================================
======= 
# Economic Unit Commiment Objective 
minimize Total_System_Cost: sum{g in GEN, t in TIME, j in SEG}(vCost[g,j]*Power_SG[g,t,j])  
 + sum{g in GEN, t in TIME}(Cost_NL[g]*StatusG[g,t] + Cost_SU[g]*StartUp[g,t] + 
Cost_SD[g]*ShutDwn[g,t]) 
 + sum{k in BRANCH, t in TIME}(PF_line*slack_Lpos[k,t] + PF_line*slack_Lneg[k,t]); 
#===========================================================================
======= 
 
#===========================================================================
======= 
# Constraints 
#===========================================================================
======= 
# Supply Level Constraints 
subject to gen_supply_minimum  {g in GEN, t in TIME}: Power_SG[g,t,1] = Sta-
tusG[g,t]*gLimit[g,1]; 
subject to gen_supply_minimum2  {g in GEN, t in TIME, j in SEG: j >= 2}: Power_SG[g,t,j] >= 
0; 
subject to gen_supply_maximum  {g in GEN, t in TIME, j in SEG: j >= 2}: Power_SG[g,t,j] <= 
StatusG[g,t]*gLimit[g,j]; 
subject to total_gen_suppply  {g in GEN, t in TIME}: Supply_T[g,t] = sum{j in 
SEG}(Power_SG[g,t,j]); 
 
# Synchronous condensor constraint 
subject to generator_is_sync_condeser {g in GEN, t in TIME: gen_max[g] == 0}: StatusG[g,t] = 0; 
 
# Minimum Up and Down time constraints 
subject to gen_minimum_time_on {g in GEN, t in TIME}: sum{s in t - min_UT[g] + 1..t: s <= 
0}(StartUp[g,s+NumPeriods]) + sum{s in t - min_UT[g] + 1..t: s > 0}(StartUp[g,s]) <= StatusG[g,t]; 
subject to gen_minimum_time_off {g in GEN, t in TIME}: sum{s in t - min_DT[g] + 1..t: s <= 
0}(ShutDwn[g,s+NumPeriods]) + sum{s in t - min_DT[g] + 1..t: s > 0}(ShutDwn[g,s]) <= 1 - StatusG[g,t]; 
 
# Start up and shutdown constraints 
subject to gen_sup_sdn   {g in GEN, t in TIME: t >= 2}:  StartUp[g,t] - ShutDwn[g,t] = 
StatusG[g,t] - StatusG[g,t-1]; 
subject to gen_sup_sdn_initial {g in GEN, t in TIME: t = 1}: StartUp[g,t] - ShutDwn[g,t] = Sta-
tusG[g,t] - StatusG[g,NumPeriods]; 
subject to gen_startup_var  {g in GEN, t in TIME}:   StartUp[g,t] <= 1; 
subject to gen_shutdown_var  {g in GEN, t in TIME}:   ShutDwn[g,t] <= 
1; 
 
# Power Balance & Net Injection Constraints 
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subject to node_balance_constraint  {i in BUS, t in TIME}: -PowrInj[i,t] + sum{g in GEN: 
gen_bus[g] == i}(Supply_T[g,t]) - Load[i,t] = 0; 
subject to total_injection_constraint {t in TIME}:   sum{i in BUS}(PowrInj[i,t]) = 0; 
 
# Line Flow Constraints 
subject to line_maximum_constraint {k in BRANCH,t in TIME}: sum{i in 
BUS}(PowrInj[i,t]*PTDF[i,k,0]) <= CAPA[k] + slack_Lpos[k,t]; 
subject to line_minimum_constraint {k in BRANCH,t in TIME}: sum{i in 
BUS}(PowrInj[i,t]*PTDF[i,k,0]) >= -CAPA[k] - slack_Lneg[k,t]; 
 
# reserve requirment constraints 
subject to total_reserve_requirement_gen_constraint {t in TIME}:   TotlRsv[t] >= 
0.05*sum{g in GEN}(Supply_T[g,t]) + 0.02*sum{g in GEN: HYD[g] = 0}(Supply_T[g,t]); 
subject to total_reserve_largest_gen_constraint  {g in GEN, t in TIME}: TotlRsv[t] >= 
SpinRsv[g,t] + (Supply_T[g,t]); 
subject to spinning_reserve_gen_max_constraint  {g in GEN, t in TIME}: SpinRsv[g,t] <= 
gen_max[g]*StatusG[g,t] - (Supply_T[g,t]); 
subject to spin_EmergencyRamp_constraint   {g in GEN, t in TIME}: SpinRsv[g,t] <= 
Ramp10[g]*StatusG[g,t]; 
subject to spinning_plus_Nonspinning_constraint  {t in TIME}:  
 TotlRsv[t] <= sum{g in GEN}(SpinRsv[g,t] + NonSpin[g,t]); 
subject to mostly_Spin_constraint     {t in TIME}:  
 0.5*TotlRsv[t] <= sum{g in GEN}(SpinRsv[g,t]); 
subject to Spin_reserve_nonzero_constraint   {g in GEN, t in TIME}: SpinRsv[g,t] >= 
0; 
subject to nonspin_reserve_nonzero_constraint  {g in GEN, t in TIME}: NonSpin[g,t] >= 
0; 
 
# Nonspinning reserve requirements 
subject to non_spin_max_constraint {g in GEN, t in TIME}: NonSpin[g,t] <= gen_max[g]*(1-
StatusG[g,t])*FS[g]; 
subject to non_spin_ramp_constraint {g in GEN, t in TIME}: NonSpin[g,t] <= Ramp10[g]*(1-
StatusG[g,t])*FS[g]; 
  
# Ramp Up & Down Constraints 
subject to gen_ramp_up_constraint  {g in GEN,t in TIME: t >= 2}: StatusG[g,t-
1]*RampHR[g] + gen_max[g]*(1 - StatusG[g,t-1]) >= (Supply_T[g,t]) - (Supply_T[g,t-1]); 
subject to gen_ramp_down_constraint  {g in GEN,t in TIME: t >= 2}: Sta-
tusG[g,t]*RampHR[g] + gen_max[g]*(1 - StatusG[g,t]) >= (Supply_T[g,t-1]) - (Supply_T[g,t]); 
subject to gen_ramp_up_constraint1  {g in GEN,t in TIME: t = 1}: Sta-
tusG[g,NumPeriods]*RampHR[g] + gen_max[g]*(1 - StatusG[g,NumPeriods]) >= (Supply_T[g,t]) - (Sup-
ply_T[g,NumPeriods]); 
subject to gen_ramp_down_constraint1 {g in GEN,t in TIME: t = 1}: StatusG[g,t]*RampHR[g] 
+ gen_max[g]*(1 - StatusG[g,t]) >= (Supply_T[g,NumPeriods]) - (Supply_T[g,t]); 
 
# Make CR model an ED model 
subject to do_not_allow_positive_relaxations {k in BRANCH, t in TIME}: slack_Lpos[k,t] = 
0; 
subject to do_not_allow_negative_relaxations {k in BRANCH, t in TIME}: slack_Lneg[k,t] = 
0; 
#===========================================================================
======= 
  
#===========================================================================
======= 
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# Data Files - 118 bus test system 
#===========================================================================
======= 
data; 
 
# Loads the data for the GENs and assigns the columns 
# Loads the data for the GENs and assigns the columns 
param: GEN: gen_bus min_UT min_DT gen_limit1 gen_limit2 gen_limit3 gen_limit4 gen_min gen_max 
Cost_SU Cost_SD Cost_NL Cost_OP1 Cost_OP2 Cost_OP3 Cost_OP4 RampHR Ramp10 FS HYD:= 
include gen_96.dat; 
include gen_96_cost_segment.dat; 
include gen_96_power_segment.dat 
 
 
# Loads the data for the Lines and assigns the columns 
param: BRANCH: fbus tbus Bk CAPA CAPE:= 
include branch_96.dat; 
 
# demand data 
param: BUS: maxLOAD:= 
include load_96.dat; 
 
# time period data 
param: TIME: LoadPrcnt:= 
include time_96.dat; 
 
# ptdf data 
include PTDF_data96.out; 
#===========================================================================
======= 
Run File 
#===========================================================================
======= 
# Yousef Al-Abdullah 
# M-29 -- Constraint Relaxation Project 
# RTS-96 Test Case - data resolved with Ahmed Salloum 
#===========================================================================
======= 
 
reset; 
model scucCR.mod; 
option solver gurobi; # for cplex --- option solver cplexamp; 
option gurobi_options $gurobi_options 'mipgap 0.01'; # for cplex --- option cplex_options "mipgap=0.1"; 
option gurobi_options $gurobi_options 'lpmethod 2'; 
option gurobi_options $gurobi_options 'outlev 1'; 
option gurobi_options $gurobi_options 'logfreq 5'; 
 
#===========================================================================
======= 
# Calculate Load 
for{i in BUS}{ 
 for{t in TIME}{ 
  let Load[i,t] := 1.1*maxLOAD[i]*LoadPrcnt[t]/100; 
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 } 
} 
for{g in GEN}{ 
 if min_UT[g] > 24 then { 
  let min_UT[g] := 24; 
 } 
 if min_DT[g] > 24 then { 
  let min_DT[g] := 24; 
 } 
} 
#===========================================================================
======= 
problem unit_commitment_CR: StatusG, Power_SG, Supply_T, SpinRsv, NonSpin, TotlRsv, StartUp, 
ShutDwn, PowrInj, slack_Lpos,  
 slack_Lneg,  
 Total_System_Cost,  
gen_supply_minimum, gen_supply_minimum2, gen_supply_maximum, total_gen_suppply, gen-
erator_is_sync_condeser, gen_minimum_time_on, gen_minimum_time_off, gen_sup_sdn, 
gen_sup_sdn_initial, gen_startup_var, gen_shutdown_var, node_balance_constraint, to-
tal_injection_constraint, line_maximum_constraint, line_minimum_constraint, to-
tal_reserve_requirement_gen_constraint, total_reserve_largest_gen_constraint, spin-
ning_reserve_gen_max_constraint, spin_EmergencyRamp_constraint,  spin-
ning_plus_Nonspinning_constraint, mostly_Spin_constraint, Spin_reserve_nonzero_constraint,  
nonspin_reserve_nonzero_constraint, non_spin_max_constraint, non_spin_ramp_constraint, 
gen_ramp_up_constraint,  gen_ramp_down_constraint, gen_ramp_up_constraint1, 
gen_ramp_down_constraint1; 
#===========================================================================
======= 
solve unit_commitment_CR; 
 
for{i in BUS}{ 
 for{t in TIME}{ 
  let LMP[i,t] := node_balance_constraint.dual[i,t]; 
 } 
} 
 
for{g in GEN}{ 
 for{t in TIME}{ 
  let gen_revenue[g,t] := LMP[gen_bus[g],t]*Supply_T[g,t]; 
  let gen_cost[g,t] := sum{j in SEG}(Power_SG[g,t,j]*vCost[g,j]) + 
Cost_NL[g]*StatusG[g,t] + Cost_SU[g]*StartUp[g,t] + Cost_SD[g]*ShutDwn[g,t]; 
  let gen_profit[g,t] := gen_revenue[g,t] - gen_cost[g,t]; 
 } 
} 
 
for{g in GEN}{ 
 let generator_revenue_all_periods[g] := sum{t in TIME}(gen_revenue[g,t]); 
 let generator_profit_all_periods[g] := sum{t in TIME}(gen_profit[g,t]); 
 let generator_cost__all_periods[g] := sum{t in TIME}(gen_cost[g,t]); 
} 
 
 
for{g in GEN}{ 
 for{t in TIME}{ 
  if LMP[gen_bus[g],t] <= vCost[g,1] then { 
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   let opportunity_cost[g,t] := 0; 
  } 
  else if LMP[gen_bus[g],t] > vCost[g,1] then { 
   let opportunity_cost[g,t] := (LMP[gen_bus[g],t] - 
vCost[g,1])*gen_max[g]*StatusG[g,t]; 
  } 
  else if LMP[gen_bus[g],t] > vCost[g,2] then { 
   let opportunity_cost[g,t] := (LMP[gen_bus[g],t] - 
vCost[g,2])*gen_max[g]*StatusG[g,t]; 
  } 
  else if LMP[gen_bus[g],t] > vCost[g,3] then { 
   let opportunity_cost[g,t] := (LMP[gen_bus[g],t] - 
vCost[g,3])*gen_max[g]*StatusG[g,t]; 
  } 
  else if LMP[gen_bus[g],t] > vCost[g,4] then { 
   let opportunity_cost[g,t] := (LMP[gen_bus[g],t] - 
vCost[g,4])*gen_max[g]*StatusG[g,t]; 
  } 
  else { 
   let opportunity_cost[g,t] := 0; 
  } 
  let current_profit[g,t] := Supply_T[g,t]*LMP[gen_bus[g],t] - sum{j in 
SEG}(Power_SG[g,t,j]*vCost[g,j]); 
 } 
} 
for{g in GEN}{ 
 for{t in TIME}{ 
  if opportunity_cost[g,t] - current_profit[g,t] > 0 then { 
   let diff_btwn_OpportunityCost_Profit[g,t] := opportunity_cost[g,t] - cur-
rent_profit[g,t]; 
  } 
  else { 
   let diff_btwn_OpportunityCost_Profit[g,t] := 0; 
  }  
 } 
} 
 
for{g in GEN}{ 
 let generator_difference_btwn_OpportunityCost_Profit[g] := sum{t in 
TIME}(diff_btwn_OpportunityCost_Profit[g,t]); 
} 
 
for{g in GEN}{ 
 let total_for_generator[g] := generator_difference_btwn_OpportunityCost_Profit[g] + genera-
tor_profit_all_periods[g]; 
} 
 
for{g in GEN}{ 
 let take_maximum[g] := max(total_for_generator[g],0); 
} 
 
for{g in GEN}{ 
 let Uplift_payment[g] := take_maximum[g] - generator_profit_all_periods[g]; 
} 
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display StatusG > CR_genON_output.out; 
display Supply_T > CR_genON_output.out; 
 
display gen_revenue > CR_genON_output.out; 
display gen_cost > CR_genON_output.out; 
display gen_profit > CR_genON_output.out; 
display Uplift_payment > CR_genON_output.out; 
 
# Record Slack/ Constraint Relaxations 
display slack_Lpos > CR_genON_output.out; 
display slack_Lneg > CR_genON_output.out; 
 
# Record System results 
display Total_System_Cost > CR_genON_output.out; 
display _total_solve_time > CR_genON_output.out;       
 # saves the solve time 
display LMP > CR_genON_output.out; 
#===========================================================================
======= 
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APPENDIX B 
CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS FROM TRANSMISSION CONTINGENCIES 
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𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∑ ∑ 𝑠𝑘𝑡
+ + 𝑠𝑘𝑡
−
𝑡𝑘  ∀𝑐 (B.1) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≥ 𝑁1𝑔?̅?𝑔𝑡(?̅?𝑔𝑡 + 𝑅𝑔
𝐸𝑀) ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (B.2) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≤ 𝑁1𝑔?̅?𝑔𝑡(?̅?𝑔𝑡 − 𝑅𝑔
𝐸𝑀) ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (B.3) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥?̅?𝑔𝑡 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (B.4) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≥ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑖𝑛?̅?𝑔𝑡 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (B.5) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∀𝑔, 𝑡, 𝐹𝑆𝑔 = 1 (B.6) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≥ 0 ∀𝑔, 𝑡, 𝐹𝑆𝑔 = 1 (B.7) 
𝑁1𝑘(−𝑃𝑘𝑡
max(𝐸𝑀) − 𝑠𝑘𝑡
− ) ≤ 𝑃𝑘𝑡 ≤ (𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐸𝑀) + 𝑠𝑘𝑡
+ )𝑁1𝑘  ∀𝑘, 𝑡 (B.8) 
𝑃𝑘𝑡 − 𝑁1𝑘𝐵𝑘(𝜃𝑛𝑡 − 𝜃𝑚𝑡) = 0 ∀𝑘, 𝑡 (B.9) 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
+ , 𝑠𝑘𝑡
− ≥ 0 ∀𝑘, 𝑡 (B.10) 
∑ 𝑃𝑘𝑡𝑘𝜖𝛿+(𝑛) − ∑ 𝑃𝑘𝑡𝑘𝜖𝛿−(𝑛) + ∑ 𝑃𝑔𝑡𝑔𝜖𝑔(𝑛) = 𝑑𝑛𝑡 ∀𝑛, 𝑡 (B.11) 
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APPENDIX C 
GREEDY ALGORITHM FOR TRANSMISSION CONTINGENCIES 
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𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒: ∑ ∑ 𝑠𝑘𝑡
+ + 𝑠𝑘𝑡
−
𝑡𝑘  ∀𝑐 (C.1) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≤ ?̅?𝑔𝑡+1(?̅?𝑔𝑡+1 + 𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅)𝛿𝑔𝑡 + 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥(1 − ?̅?𝑔𝑡+1)𝛿𝑔𝑡 + (?̅?𝑔𝑡 + 𝑅𝑔
10)(1 − 𝛿𝑔𝑡)  
 ∀?̅?𝑔𝑡 = 1, 𝑔, 𝑡 (C.2) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≤ ?̅?𝑔𝑡−1(?̅?𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅)𝛿𝑔𝑡 + 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥(1 − ?̅?𝑔𝑡−1)𝛿𝑔𝑡 + (?̅?𝑔𝑡 + 𝑅𝑔
10)(1 − 𝛿𝑔𝑡)  
 ∀?̅?𝑔𝑡 = 1, 𝑔, 𝑡 (C.3) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≥ (?̅?𝑔𝑡+1(?̅?𝑔𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅)) 𝛿𝑔𝑡 + (?̅?𝑔𝑡 − 𝑅𝑔
10)   ∀?̅?𝑔𝑡 = 1, 𝑔, 𝑡 (C.4) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≥ (?̅?𝑔𝑡−1(?̅?𝑔𝑡−1 − 𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅)) 𝛿𝑔𝑡 + (?̅?𝑔𝑡 − 𝑅𝑔
10)(1 − 𝛿𝑔𝑡) ∀?̅?𝑔𝑡 = 1, 𝑔, 𝑡 (C.5) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≤ ?̂?𝑔𝑡?̅?𝑔𝑡+1(?̅?𝑔𝑡+1 + 𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅) + 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥?̂?𝑔𝑡(1 − ?̅?𝑔𝑡+1)  ∀?̅?𝑔𝑡 = 0, 𝑔, 𝑡 (C.6) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≤ ?̂?𝑔𝑡?̅?𝑔𝑡−1(?̅?𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅) + 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥?̂?𝑔𝑡(1 − ?̅?𝑔𝑡−1) ∀?̅?𝑔𝑡 = 0, 𝑔, 𝑡 (C.7) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≥ ?̂?𝑔𝑡?̅?𝑔𝑡+1(?̅?𝑔𝑡+1 + 𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅) ∀?̅?𝑔𝑡 = 0, 𝑔, 𝑡 (C.8) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≥ ?̂?𝑔𝑡?̅?𝑔𝑡+1(?̅?𝑔𝑡+1 + 𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅) ∀?̅?𝑔𝑡 = 0, 𝑔, 𝑡 (C.9) 
𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑖𝑛?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≤ ?̂?𝑔𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥?̂?𝑔𝑡 ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 (C.10) 
𝑃𝑘𝑡 − 𝑁1𝑘𝐵𝑘(𝜃𝑛 − 𝜃𝑚) = 0 ∀ 𝑘, 𝑡 (C.11) 
𝑁1𝑘(−𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑐 − 𝑠𝑘𝑡
− ) ≤ 𝑃𝑘𝑡 ≤ 𝑁1𝑘(𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑐 + 𝑠𝑘𝑡
+ ) ∀ 𝑘, 𝑡 (C.12) 
∑ 𝑃𝑘𝑡𝑘𝜖𝛿+(𝑛) − ∑ 𝑃𝑘𝑡𝑘𝜖𝛿−(𝑛) + ∑ 𝑃𝑔𝑡𝑔𝜖𝑔(𝑛) = 𝑑𝑛𝑡  ∀ 𝑛, 𝑡   (C.13) 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
+ , 𝑠𝑘𝑡
− ≥ 0 ∀ 𝑘, 𝑡 (C.14) 
?̂?𝑔𝑡 = ?̅?𝑔𝑡 [𝜆𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠] ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 (C.15) 
𝛿𝑔𝑡 = 0 [𝜆𝐷𝐷𝑃] ∀?̅?𝑔𝑡 = 1, 𝑔, 𝑡 (C.16) 
𝛿𝑔𝑡 = 1 ∀?̅?𝑔𝑡 = 0, 𝑔, 𝑡 (C.17) 
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APPENDIX D 
CALCULATION OF UPLIFT PAYMENTS WITH OPPORTUNITY COSTS 
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In this section, uplift payments are calculated based on opportunity cost. When 
the LMP is higher than the generator operating cost and the generator is not dispatched at 
its maximum capacity, the generator will be paid the difference between the LMP and its 
operating cost for its remaining dispatch capability, which is shown in (D.1). Even after 
receiving the uplift payment from (D.1), generators may still not obtain enough revenue 
to cover their costs over the entire operating day. Therefore, a generator receiving a nega-
tive profit over the entire operating day will be compensated by the ISO such that the 
generator breaks even. The additional uplift payment to the generators is calculated using 
(D.3). The total uplift payment is the sum of these two quantities (D.4). 
𝑈𝐿𝑔
1 = ∑ ((𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑔(𝑛)𝑡  − 𝑐𝑔)(𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑃𝑔𝑡))𝑡𝜖𝑇   ∀ 𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑔(𝑛)𝑡  > 𝑐𝑔, 𝑔, 𝑡 (D.1) 
Π𝑔
1 = ∑ (𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑔(𝑛)𝑡𝑃𝑔𝑡 − 𝑇𝐶𝑔𝑡)𝑡𝜖𝑇 + 𝑈𝐿𝑔
1  ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (D.2) 
𝑈𝐿𝑔
2 = {
−Π𝑔
1 𝑖𝑓 Π𝑔
1 < 0
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (D.3) 
𝑈𝐿𝑔 = 𝑈𝐿𝑔
1 + 𝑈𝐿𝑔
2  ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (D.4) 
 
